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Protecting Diversity in the Ivory 
Tower with Liability Rules 
 
Ting Wang* 
 
Abstract 
 
The two sides of the debate over race-based affirmative 
action in higher education tell two distinct stories – one of 
diversity’s benefits and the other of affirmative action’s burdens.  
In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Supreme Court 
found the benefits to be so compelling to society that they were 
deemed to outweigh the burdens.  Voters in Michigan and other 
states found otherwise and the Court in Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. — (2014) upheld their right 
to ban race-conscious admissions.  Paradoxically, since the use 
of race as a “plus factor” by selective universities to admit a few 
underrepresented minority applicants makes possible a diverse 
learning environment that benefits all students on campus, the 
beneficiaries should far outnumber and outvote the few 
applicants who are displaced.  But because those actually 
burdened are not known, the number of imagined victims is 
easily inflated in the mind of electorate.  In highlighting this and 
other shortcomings of the Grutter regime, this article proposes 
that if the benefits of diversity outweigh the burdens, the 
universities should be able to demonstrate this favorable cost-
benefit ratio by accommodating the real burden-bearers. 
Accommodation could come in the form of direct 
compensation for the displaced students or indirect burden-
shifting – getting others to give up their seats.  Shifting the 
 
* The author (Yale Law School, J.D. 2005, Harvard University, AB-AM, 2002) 
is an associate at the law firm of Paul Hastings LLP.  He wishes to thank 
Stephen Yandle, Guido Calabresi, Ian Ayres, Robert Ellickson, Jed Rubenfeld, 
Goodwin Liu, Margaret Jane Radin, Daniel Ho, Thomas Kane, Peter Schuck 
and Daniel Walfish for their guidance and suggestions, and Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor and Judge John M. Walker, Jr. for their encouragement.  The 
views expressed are entirely his.  He welcomes reader feedback and can be 
reached at ting.wang@aya.yale.edu. 
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burden to those who are more willing to bear it can lower the 
cost of settlement.  In-kind benefits and gifts could be used 
instead of monetary compensation.  Addressing the 
displacement burden would reduce much of the grievances 
against racial preferences in admissions, and reveal to the public 
how little affirmative action affects the vast majority of 
applicants.  Of course, it would impose costs on the university, 
but the willingness of universities to take on these costs also 
demonstrates their commitment to the benefits of diversity.  A 
skeptical Court in Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. —- 
(2013) remanded for lower courts to determine whether race-
conscious admissions are still necessary when the university 
was already achieving on-campus diversity through race-neutral 
means.  Accommodation could provide a convincing showing that 
the extra benefits from using the race-plus factor are indeed 
worth the costs. 
Lastly, accommodation would give universities a much 
stronger incentive to address the academic achievement gap 
across racial groups, which makes affirmative action necessary 
in the first place.  Grutter permits the use of race in admissions 
for 25 years to eliminate this gap.  But scant evidence of progress 
over the past decade raises concerns that the universities are 
perpetuating the gap by holding students of different racial 
groups to different standards.  If accommodation is required, 
universities would find it in their interest to encourage those 
minority students who could be accepted with the help of the 
race-plus factor to improve their academic credentials further so 
they could be admitted without triggering the need to 
accommodate a displaced applicant.  Only then will the gap start 
to narrow and lead to the realization of Grutter’s goal – achieving 
diversity without resorting to race-conscious means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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I. Introduction 
 
Ten years after Grutter v. Bollinger endorsed the University 
of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions program 
with a 25-year operating license, the same dispute returned to 
the Supreme Court in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action after Michigan’s voters approved a state constitutional 
ban of racial preferences.1  The High Court, in affirming the 
right of the electorate to effectively reverse itself, has cleared the 
way for more states to overturn Grutter via the political process.2  
For supporters of affirmative action who had won the proverbial 
battle but are now losing the war, this turnabout is both 
paradoxical and predictable. 
It is paradoxical because affirmative action in higher 
education should be a consistent political winner.  When 
selective colleges and universities (“schools”) consider the race of 
a few of underrepresented minority applicants as a “plus factor” 
to accept them, they create diverse learning environments that 
benefit all students on their campuses.  The Grutter Court 
agreed with amici that graduates of these schools go on to 
contribute to society as better citizens, professionals, and 
ultimately, leaders in a diverse, inclusive and united country.3  
Hence, the educational benefits of diversity were held to be 
compelling to the government, and could justify, at least for a 
time, race-conscious means to achieve diversity.  Using racial 
preferences to admit a few minority applicants also displaces an 
equally few if not fewer number of other applicants who would 
have been accepted had the admissions policy been “race-
neutral.”  These rejected applicants, who bear the true 
displacement burden of affirmative action, are far outnumbered 
by the beneficiaries of diversity.  When the numbers are such, 
affirmative action’s supporters ought to consistently outvote its 
opponents. 4   In Michigan, the three counties with state 
 
1. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
2. For states that have already banned affirmative action in public higher 
education, see infra Table 1 and note 22.  For states that may be planning anti-
affirmative action ballot initiatives, see infra note 272. 
3. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32. 
4. See infra Part III.B.2. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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universities expressly targeted by the proposed constitutional 
ban all voted against the ban.5 
The turnabout is predictable because of a common 
misperception about the impact of admissions preferences.  
Selective schools reject far more applicants than they admit but 
those actually displaced by racial preferences constitute only a 
small fraction of the rejected applicant pool.  Since these real 
cost-bearers are not identified, many more rejected applicants 
(and their parents and sympathizers) will blame or resent 
affirmative action.6  As the competition to gain admission to 
selective schools increases, so does misplaced resentment 
against race-conscious admissions policies.  Those who do not get 
to participate in the diverse learning environment are also less 
likely to believe the benefits of diversity.  Thus when the 
perceived cost of the program is inflated and its benefits are 
undervalued, the otherwise favorable cost-benefit balance is 
subverted and the public will vote to ban, as all 80 of Michigan’s 
other counties did.7 
To counter this dynamic, this article proposes that schools 
should accommodate the few who are really displaced to dispel 
the misplaced resentment of the many.  Only then could the 
public understand that rather than a social engineering project 
of mythic proportions, affirmative action has always been a 
limited, marginal remedy used by some selective schools to 
create racially-diverse campuses that help far more than 
burden.  The rule-maker, whether a judge, legislator or voter, 
can modify the current Grutter regime by requiring that schools 
“internalize” the burdens they create from using race in 
admissions.  A school can internalize the burden by 
accommodating those who are displaced or other applicants who 
agree to take on the burden.  Accommodation, which can be 
monetary, gift-oriented or in-kind, induces the displaced 
applicants or other eligible applicants to give up their claim to a 
seat for a race-plus admit. 
So long as a school can certify that it has accounted for the 
burdens from each use of the race-plus factor, its admissions 
 
5. See infra note 55. 
6. See infra Part III.B.2. 
7. See infra note 55. 
5
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program should be deemed “narrowly tailored” to satisfy the 
Court’s strict scrutiny standard.  Such a regime would be 
simpler for judges to review than any test that relies on the 
schools’ “complex educational judgments” which have 
confounded the courts.8   Furthermore, accommodation would 
demonstrate that no one is made worse off in the course of 
creating a racially-diverse campus, so the public could be 
assured that the benefits of diversity do indeed outweigh the 
burdens. 
Schools have been reluctant to identify the applicants they 
displace because (1) they have not had to, (2) they fear litigation, 
(3) they do not know how to settle with these individuals, and (4) 
it might be costly.  This article asserts that the schools should 
settle when the cost of not settling is higher. 9   Faced with 
outright bans across the country, schools can no longer ignore 
the displacement impact of their admissions policies.  In 
exchange for taking on the burden of admissions prices, schools 
would be shielded from liability for their race-conscious 
admissions decisions.  The switch from absolute to conditional 
legal protection for affirmative action allows for more flexible 
accommodation mechanisms based on liability rules, which are 
more adept at drawing out private valuations and lowering 
settlement costs. 10   The actual burden on the displaced is 
believed to be light, and the settlement mechanism can cost-shift 
and allow others to take on the burden for less.  If compensatory 
transactions raise moral concerns about commodifying 
admissions, accommodation could be arranged through gifts in 
accord with the concept of market-inalienability.11 
The accommodation requirement would prompt schools to 
do more about the academic achievement gap across racial 
groups, the real cause for the need to use race in admissions.  
The Court in Grutter recognized this problem and required 
schools to use the race-plus factor not only to overcome the gap 
but to narrow it.  Over the past decade, however, the 
 
8. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.  For a discussion of the remand in Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), see infra Part IV.B. 
9. For Michelman’s efficiency model, see infra Part IV.D. 
10. For Calabresi and Malamed’s liability rules, see infra Part V.A. 
11. For Radin’s market-inalienability rules, see infra Part V.C. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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achievement gap has remained virtually unchanged.12  The lack 
of progress shows that the schools are not prepared for Grutter’s 
sunset, and may be vulnerable to criticism that they are helping 
to perpetuate the achievement gap by holding applicants of 
different racial groups to different standards.13  Once the schools 
begin to internalize the burden, they will have much greater 
incentive to expand the pipeline of minority students who can be 
admitted without the help of race as a plus factor. 14   When 
schools can achieve diversity entirely through such applicants, 
they would no longer need to accommodate anyone, and the 
accommodation requirement proposed here will obviate itself. 
This article is composed of six parts.  The political backlash 
against affirmative action in higher education (discussed in Part 
I) is aggravated by several shortcomings in the Grutter regime 
(identified in Part II).  In Part III, the benefits of diversity and 
burdens of affirmative action are examined in turn and then 
analyzed together using a cost-benefit analysis that also 
considers the cost of ignoring the problem of inflated burdens.  
Part IV explains the paradigm shift proposed in this article from 
the standpoint of liability rules, constitutional jurisprudence 
and the critique of market inalienability.  Part V outlines 
various designs for the accommodation mechanism that schools 
could choose from and customize.  Part VI assesses the impact 
of accommodation on schools, students, and society. 
 
II. Political Backlash 
 
In the decade since the nine Justices decided Grutter v. 
Bollinger, more than nine million citizens have cast their own 
votes on the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action.15  
State actions permitted by the Federal Constitution can 
nevertheless be banned by state constitutions and laws.16  From 
2003 to 2012, four states – Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona and 
 
12. See infra Part III.B.3. 
13. See infra Part III.B.4. 
14. See infra Part VII.A. 
15. See infra Table 1 and note 22. 
16. “Grutter never said, or even hinted, that state universities must do 
what they narrowly may do.”  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 
473 F.3d 237, 249 (6th Cir. 2006). 
7
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Oklahoma – through voter initiatives, amended their state 
constitutions to bar race-based admissions preferences at state 
universities, joining California and Washington whose 
electorates had approved earlier bans.17  In 2014, the Supreme 
Court upheld the right of voters to do so in Schuette, effectively 
foreclosing further court challenges against such enactments by 
affirmative action’s supporters.18   Counting New Hampshire, 
where the state legislature passed a statutory ban in 2011,19 and 
Florida, where racial preferences in admissions were ended via 
executive order,20 more than a quarter of the country now lives 
in states that have ended affirmative action through the political 
process.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. See infra Table 1 and note 22. 
18. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 
F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 
132 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
19. H.B. 623, 2011 Gen. Ct., 162nd Sess. (N.H. 2011) (became effective on 
Jan. 1, 2012). 
20. Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (1999). 
21. Based on a tally of the 2010 U.S. Census figures. 2010 Census Data, 
U.S. CENSUS 2010, http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/ (last visited May 
31, 2015). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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Table 1: Anti-Affirmative Action Initiatives Decided by Voters22 
 
State Year Initiative Votes  
For 
Pct. Votes 
Against 
Pct. Enactment, if 
any 
California 1995  Proposition 
209 
5,268,462 54.6% 4,388,733 45.4% CAL. CONST. 
Art. 1, § 31 
Washington 1998 Initiative 200 1,099,410 58.2% 788,930 41.8% WASH. REV. 
CODE § 
49.60.400 
(1999). 
Michigan 2006 Proposal 2 2,141,010 57.9% 1,555,691 42.1% MICH. CONST. 
Art. 1, § 26. 
Colorado 2008 Amendment 
46 
1,102,046 49.2% 1,138,134 50.8% - 
Nebraska 2008  Initiative 424 404,766 57.6% 298,401 42.4% NEB. CONST. 
Art 1, § 30. 
Arizona 2010 Proposition 
107 
952,086 59.5% 647,713 40.5% ARIZ. CONST. 
Art. 2, § 36 
Oklahoma 2012 State Question 
759 
745,854 59.2% 514,163 40.8% OKLA. CONST. 
Art. 2, §36 
 
Far from settling, even temporarily, the great affirmative 
action debate, Grutter has merely pushed it from the judicial to 
the political arena.23   With the change of venue, affirmative 
 
22. For sources of voting results, see State of Arizona Official Canvass 1, 
ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (2010), available at 
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2010/General/Canvass2010GE.pdf; 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF VOTE 34-36, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (1996), 
available at https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/1996-general/ssov/ssov-
complete.pdf; OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABSTRACT OF VOTE CAST FOR THE 
2008 PRIMARY 2008 GENERAL 137, COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE (2008), available at 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/2008/2008_Abstract.pdf; 
November 7, 2006 Election Results, State Proposal – 06-2: Constitutional 
Amendment to Ban Affirmative Action Programs, MICH. SEC’Y OF STATE (2006) 
[hereinafter Michigan 2006 Results], 
http://miboecfr.nicusa.com/election/results/06GEN/90000002.html (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2015); November 6, 2012 Official Results: Federal, State, Legislative 
and Judicial Races, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. (2012), available at 
http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/12gen_seb.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2015); November 3, 1998 General Election Results, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE 
(1998), http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/results_report.aspx?e=10&c=&c2=&t 
=&t2=&p=&p2=&y= (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
23 . See, e.g., EndRacePreferences, Opposition Member Harasses and 
9
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action’s opponents have seized on the promise of race-blind 
equality and adopted the rhetoric of the Civil Rights 
Movement.24  Affirmative action’s supporters have fought back 
vigorously through litigation and political mobilization,25  but 
have only slowed the advance of the “civil rights initiatives.”  
They have kept the question off the ballot in several states,26 and 
narrowly defeated Colorado’s Amendment 46 in 2008.27   But 
efforts to turn the tide, to have the public endorse affirmative 
action, have been unsuccessful.  A counter-initiative in Colorado 
failed to gather enough signatures in 2008.28   An upswell of 
 
Intimidates OkCRI Circulator, YOUTUBE (uploaded Nov. 14, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Csr2rnWvn94 (supporters and opponents 
of affirmative action arguing in the parking lot of Tulsa grocery store). 
24 . See ARIZONA BALLOT PROPOSITION GUIDE: ARGUMENTS “FOR” 
PROPOSITION 107 34, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (2010) [hereinafter ARGUMENTS 
“FOR” PROPOSITION 107], available at 
apps.azsos.gov/election/2010/info/PubPamphlet/english/prop107.pdf 
(statement by Steve Montenegro, State Representative, Litchfield Park, 
invoking the words of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.); NOVEMBER GENERAL 
ELECTION PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (2010), 
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2010/Info/Misc_Info.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2015); INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INITIATIVE 424, 
NEB. SEC’Y OF STATE (2008), available at 
http://www.sos.ne.gov/elec/2008/pdf/pamphlet%20424.pdf (“This 
constitutional amendment mirrors the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
advances true equality and fairness by prohibiting discrimination and 
preferential treatment based on race, gender, and color.”). 
25 . See, e.g., Melissa Hart, The State-by-State Assault on Equal 
Opportunity, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 1, 10-13 (Sept. 2008), available 
at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Hart_issue_brief.pdf; Jessica 
Larson & Stephen Menendian, Anti-Affirmative Action Ballot Initiatives, 
KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY 1, 3-12 (Dec. 2008), 
available at 
http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2008/12_2008_AntiAffirmativeAc
tionBallotInitiatives.pdf; see also Valerie Richardson, Colorado Takes Aim at 
Race, Sex Preferences, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2007), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/apr/24/20070424-121644-
1418r/?page=all; Naomi Zeveloff, Affirmative Attack: Colorado Diversity 
Programs Targeted Again, COLO. SPRINGS INDEP. (May 3, 2007), 
http://www.csindy.com/coloradosprings/affirmative-attack/ 
Content?oid=1138314. 
26. Hart supra note 25, at 10-11; Larson & Menendian, supra note 25, at 
3-7. 
27. See Colleen Slevin, Colorado Voters Reject Affirmative Action Ban, 
ASPEN TIMES (Nov. 7, 2008), 
http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20081107/NEWS/811079959. 
28. Hart supra note 25, at 11-12 (discussing Colorado Initiative 82). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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Asian-American opposition in the spring of 2014 halted a 
California State Senate proposal to ask voters to reinstate race-
conscious admissions.29 
The involvement of more people, resources and passion has 
not brought greater clarity to this controversy.  Despite 
overwhelming amici support for diversity in higher education, 
which persuaded the Grutter majority that race-conscious 
admissions benefits society as a whole, the supporters cannot 
show that the benefits of diversity outweigh the burdens of 
affirmative action.  Though very few applicants are actually 
displaced by the race-plus preference, there are no publicly 
available figures, and the fear of being harmed is easily inflated 
in the mind of the public,30 especially as acceptance rates at 
selective schools fall into the single digits31 and opponents make 
personal appeals about being wronged by race-based 
preferences.32 
To understand the causes of the political backlash against 
Grutter, we must begin with the opinion itself. 
 
III. Grutter’s Legacy 
 
A. What Grutter Decided 
 
Grutter is commonly thought of as a narrowly decided 5-4 
opinion, but it could also be read as a three-part ruling with 
support from five, six and seven Justices.  The central doctrinal 
feature of Grutter is the Court’s recognition that the benefits of 
 
29. Katy Murphy, California Asian-Americans Show Strength in Blocking 
Affirmative Action Revival, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 6:07 PM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/education/ci_25363174/california-asian-
americans-show-strength-blocking-affirmative-action?source=pkg. 
30 . See infra Part III.B.2 for an illustration of the actual extent of 
displacement at the Michigan Law School in Grutter and explanation of the 
inflated burden. 
31.  Twelve colleges and universities rejected more than ninety percent of 
their applicants during the fall 2013 admissions cycle.  Best College Rankings 
and Lists: Top 100 – Lowest Acceptance Rates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS, 
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/lowest-
acceptance-rate?src=stats (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
32. See, e.g., ARGUMENTS “FOR” PROPOSITION 107, supra note 24, at 35, 37 
(statements by Jennifer Gratz of Sacramento, California and Frank Ricci of 
Wallingford, Connecticut). 
11
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diversity in higher education are compelling to the government 
and could justify racial preferences in admissions.  This position 
actually drew the support of six Justices, the five who signed 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy, who 
dissented on other grounds. 33   They were persuaded that 
diversity in higher education helps foster a more cohesive 
country, especially in the training of future leaders 34  and 
reaffirmed Justice Powell’s single-vote endorsement of the 
diversity rationale in Bakke.35 
The main operative feature of Grutter, also the narrowest 
part of the holding, focuses on how schools may use race to 
achieve diversity.  With quotas already banned by Bakke and 
extra points in admissions formulas struck down in Gratz, the 
five Justices of the O’Connor majority settled on using race as a 
“plus factor” in a school’s individualized review of applications 
as the only permissible racial preference. 36   The concept of 
individualized or holistic review had also been endorsed by 
Justice Powell in Bakke, who praised the admissions program of 
Harvard College (“Harvard Plan”) for considering applicants 
individually, as opposed to data points in formulas, and looking 
for personal qualities “that may contribute to educational 
 
33.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 392-93, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering 
race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity . . . .”). 
34. Id. at 308, 342, 332 (“Universities . . . represent the training ground 
for a large number of the Nation’s leaders . . . . [N]othing less than ‘the nation’s 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and 
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples . . . . Effective 
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our 
Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”). 
35. Justice Powell, whose opinion bridged a pair of opposing four-justice 
voting blocks and became the ruling of the Court, was the only Justice in Bakke 
to mention the diversity rationale. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 312-14 (1978).  Justice Powell had characterized the government as 
holding “a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly 
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race 
and ethnic origin.” Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added).  Grutter upgraded this 
interest to compelling status.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.  Justice Kennedy 
agreed.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[S]tudent body 
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in 
university admissions.”). 
36. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 295-97 (2003); Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 325, 328. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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pluralism.”37  According to the Harvard Plan, when two equally 
admissible applicants are compared as individuals, the race of 
the minority applicant might be deemed a plus that “may tip the 
balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a 
farm may tip the balance in other.”38 
To Justice Powell’s explanation of individualized 
admissions review, the O’Connor majority added the concept of 
“critical mass,” defined more or less as the “meaningful 
numbers” of underrepresented minority students that a school 
needs to enroll to produce the kind of educational benefits that 
the government finds compelling.39  Rejected applicants are not 
unduly harmed by the race-based preferences, Justice O’Connor 
concluded, citing Justice Powell, who had reasoned that since 
these applicants were also reviewed individually for their 
potential to contribute to diversity on campus, they would “have 
no basis to complain of unequal treatment.” 40   In effect, the 
O’Connor majority found individualized review, as opposed to 
quotas or formulas, to have reduced the impact of race on 
applicants of non-favored races sufficiently that whatever 
burdens they may complain of are far outweighed by the 
important benefits that diversity provides.41 
 
37 . See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (listing qualifications valued by the 
Harvard Plan: “exceptional personal talents, unique work or service 
experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a 
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or 
other qualifications deemed important.”); cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314-15 (“Law 
School looks for individuals [who can contribute] in diverse ways to the well-
being others.” The admissions policy assesses applicants for their “potential ‘to 
contribute to the learning of those around them  . . . policy aspires to ‘achieve 
that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus 
make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.’”). 
38. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323.  Similarly, Grutter permits schools to “consider 
race or ethnicity only as a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file . . . [along with] 
all [other] pertinent elements of diversity . . . of the particular qualifications of 
each applicant . . . although not necessarily according them the same weight.” 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.  This race-plus factor could be “outcome 
determinative” to the extent that the “plus” given to “the race of an applicant 
may tip the balance in [favor of his admission].”  Id. at 339. 
39. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316. 
40. Id. at 441 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318). 
41. “To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must 
not ‘unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and 
ethnic groups.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added) (citing Metro Broad. 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).  Justice 
13
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Justice Kennedy differed from the majority not so much in 
how individualized review is designed to work – he lauded the 
race-conscious admissions programs of the “Little Ivy League” 
liberal arts colleges – but expressed doubts about how race was 
actually being used by the Michigan Law School.42  He noted 
that the enrollment of underrepresented minority students 
fluctuated very slightly from year to year and that the 
admissions office actively tracked the number of minority 
applicants accepted on a daily basis.43  To him, these were signs 
that the school was trying to fulfill quasi-quota targets.44  The 
degree to which race-conscious admissions programs ought to be 
scrutinized by the courts remains a point of controversy in 
Fisher whose opinion was written by Justice Kennedy.45 
The part of the Grutter ruling that received the broadest 
support is the durational limit on the use of race in admissions.46  
Having extolled the virtues of diversity, Justice O’Connor 
nevertheless reaffirmed the “core purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” to “do away 
with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race” 
and made clear that the use of race in admissions cannot 
continue indefinitely.47  She urged schools to search actively for 
 
O’Connor then concluded, “[w]e agree that, in the context of its individualized 
inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law 
School’s race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority 
applicants.”  Id. (emphasis added).  See also infra Part V.C. for further 
discussion of the burden and infra Part V.B. on the Court’s balancing of the 
benefits and burdens through the strict scrutiny test. 
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. (noting that, in contrast, the liberal arts colleges did “not keep 
ongoing tallies of racial or ethnic composition of their entering students.”). 
44. Id. (“The consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the 
admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at individual review 
save for race itself. . . . The bonus factor of race would then become divorced 
from individual review; it would be premised instead on the numerical 
objective set by the Law School.”). 
45. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); see infra Part IV.B. 
46. On this point, Justice O’Connor directly rebutted the Sixth Circuit, 
which declined to impose a durational requirement and was satisfied that “the 
Law School intends to consider race and ethnicity to achieve a diverse and 
robust student body only until it becomes possible to enroll a ‘critical mass’ of 
under-represented minority students through race-neutral means.” Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 752 (6th Cir. 2002). 
47. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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race-neutral means to achieve campus diversity so they could 
terminate their race-conscious admissions programs “as soon as 
practicable.” 48   She expressed “hope” that efforts to improve 
education of underrepresented minority students will narrow 
the “achievement gap” so that race-conscious measures will no 
longer be necessary in 25 years’ time.49  This sunset clause drew 
concurrences from Justices Thomas and Scalia.50 
Hence, Grutter marks the beginning of a transition in 
American higher education from race-conscious to race-neutral 
or race-blind means to achieve campus diversity.  The Court 
realized that the need to use race in admissions arises from the 
achievement gap, which leaves a shortage of competitive 
underrepresented minority applicants for selective schools to 
assemble critical masses via race-neutral or race-blind methods, 
so the success of the transition turns on efforts to narrow the 
achievement gap.  To this end, Justice O’Connor held that race-
conscious admissions programs approved in Grutter (the 
“Grutter regime”) must not only produce campus diversity but 
must also eliminate the achievement gap itself.  The “acid test” 
for race-conscious admissions programs, she noted, “will be their 
efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic 
preferences at all.”51 
 
B. Grutter’s Shortcomings 
 
Grutter gave race-conscious admissions policy a 
considerable judicial lease, but the ballot box backlash against 
affirmative action is undermining the regime well before the 
sunset period has elapsed.  Though the reasons for the backlash 
 
48 . Id. at 343.  The Supreme Court was more forceful about this 
requirement than the Sixth Circuit, which was content to accept that the 
“admissions policy is ‘sensit[ive] to the possibility that [it] might someday have 
satisfied its purpose.’”  Grutter, 288 F.3d at 752. 
49. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310 (“The court expects that 25 years from now, 
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.”). 
50. See id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in judgment); 
id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 344 (Ginsberg, J., concurring). 
51. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (quoting Nathaniel Nathanson & Casimir J. 
Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority 
Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 CHI. B. REC. 282, 293 (May–June 1977)). 
15
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are manifold, several flaws in the Grutter regime itself are 
contributing to its demise.  The Grutter regime obscures the true 
benefit-balance of diversity programs, leaving doubters 
unconvinced of diversity’s benefits, and supporters deprived of 
facts to dispel public misconceptions.  The regime provides no 
way to track the transition toward the race-neutral future it 
mandates and may in fact be creating headwinds against the 
transition.  Any reforms to the regime must address these flaws. 
 
1. A Polarized Debate 
 
For decades, supporters of affirmative action have touted 
the benefits of diversity while skeptics complained about the 
unfairness of displacement by racial preferences.  This division 
in the debate is reinforced by the way race-conscious admissions 
programs keep the two sides from seeing each other’s claims.  
Diversity is an experienced good; one has to experience the 
diverse learning environment to appreciate its benefits.  
Students in this environment are surrounded by fellow 
beneficiaries and express strong support for affirmative action.  
In a 1999 Gallup survey, 91% of students at the Michigan Law 
School reported diversity as having a positive impact on their 
educational experience. 52   These students, however, are less 
likely to consider the grievances felt by those who think they 
were harmed by admissions preferences because those 
individuals have been rejected out of view.53 
The rejected applicants who do not get to partake in the 
diverse learning environment are less likely to believe the 
benefits.  They are more likely to complain about the unfairness 
of getting displaced.  This difference in perspective is neatly 
encapsulated in the case of Patrick Hamacher and his girlfriend, 
Kathleen Hadden.  Hamacher, who is white, was rejected by the 
University of Michigan and became a co-plaintiff in Gratz. 
 
52 . See Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: 
Student Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: 
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 143, 160-61 (Gary Orfield & 
Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001).  The survey interviewed 81% of the students at 
Michigan Law School and Harvard Law School.  Id. at 154. 
53. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-241) (Justice Scalia noting that those particular Michigan Law 
School students had already been admitted). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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Hadden, who is also white, disagrees with his lawsuit because 
she attended the University and feels the racially-diverse 
learning environment enriched her educational experience. 54  
The difference in perception is also reflected in voting patterns 
on Proposal 2, which prevailed in 80 of Michigan’s 83 counties.55  
The three counties that had majority “no” votes happen to be 
home to the three universities, Michigan, Michigan State and 
Wayne State, which Proposal 2 expressly targeted.  Wayne 
County, home to Detroit, had a population that was just over 
40% black, but the other two counties, Ingham and Washtenaw, 
were over three-quarters white. 56   Their votes reflect the 
concentration of diversity’s beneficiaries in and around the 
campuses where the benefits are created and most keenly felt.57 
The Grutter majority was persuaded by the beneficiaries, 
and allowed the benefits that flow from student body diversity 
to override the burdens cited by the opponents, who were 
infuriated by the ruling and unconvinced of its conclusions.58  
Despite calls for dialogue, the two sides entrenched in their fixed 
positions continue to talk past each other.59  As hundreds of 
 
54. Jacques Steinberg, 3 Look to College Suit to Show Their Merits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/us/3-look-to-
college-suit-to-show-their-merits.html. 
55. See the following table: 
Table A: Proposal 2 results – five counties with the highest percentage of 
“No” votes. 
County “Yes” votes “No” Votes “Yes” pct. “No”  pct.  
Wayne  254,545 367,716 40.9% 59.1% 
Washtenaw  55,796 75,427 42.5% 57.5% 
Ingham  49,539 53,235 48.2% 51.8% 
Kalamazoo  48,504 43,489 52.7% 47.3% 
Isabella  9,852 8,543 53.6% 46.4% 
Michigan 2006 Results, supra note 22. 
56. See Estimated Population of Michigan by Age, Race and Sex: 2000-
2008, MICH. DEP’T TECH., MGMT. & BUDGET [hereinafter Michigan Population], 
http://www.michigan.gov/cgi/0,4548,7-158-54534_51713_51714-214745--
,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
57. The two counties with the next highest proportions of votes against 
Proposal 2, Kalamazoo and Isabella, are home to Western Michigan University 
and Central Michigan University, respectively.  See Table A, supra note 55.  
Both counties had populations over 80% white.  See Michigan Population, 
supra note 56. 
58. See infra Parts III.B.2, IV.C. 
59. See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Delicate Obama Path on Class and Race 
Preferences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2008), 
17
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thousands go through the ordeal of applying to college and 
graduate school each year, fresh recruits are added to each side 
of this polarizing controversy. 
The benefits of diversity have broad cross-racial appeal, but 
racial preferences are divisive.  In a nationwide survey of over 
1,800 high school juniors conducted in May of 2004, 82% 
considered racial preferences to be unfair and 78% said using 
race, ethnicity and religious background as admissions factors 
affects the way non-minority students feel about minority 
students.60  But two-thirds felt they benefited from diversity in 
high school, and 70% said it was important to have a diverse 
environment at the college they attend.61  In other words, the 
majority of those surveyed wants the benefits of diversity but is 
concerned about the burdens of racial preferences.62 
The fear and disappointment of rejection along with 
perceived unfairness of racial preferences can create potent 
political opposition to affirmative action.  Younger generations 
of voters with fresh memories of their own experience with 
admissions in higher education are more likely to oppose 
affirmative action.  A national poll conducted in 2003 found 
young people between ages 18 and 27 opposed affirmative action 
by a much greater margin, 67% against to 22% in favor, than 
those over age 65, whose opposition to affirmative action ran 
45% to 34%. 63   Unwilling to wait for Grutter to sunset, the 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/us/politics/03affirmative.html?pagewante
d=1&_r=0 (John Payton, director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, calling for a thoughtful national conversation about race and class). 
60. Laura Kujawski, Students Value Diversity in High School and College, 
PNNONLINE (Sept. 22, 2004), 
http://www.amren.com/news/2004/09/students_value/ (reporting the results of 
the survey conducted by National Research Center for College and University 
Admissions). 
61. Id. 
62 . In a survey of medical students at Harvard University and the 
University of San Francisco, 86% reported that diversity had enhanced their 
learning experience, but only 57% expressed support for affirmative action.  
Dean K. Whitla et al., Educational Benefits of Diversity in Medical School: A 
Survey of Students, 78 ACAD. MED. 460, 466 (2003). 
63 . David Savage, Bush’s Opposition to Racial Preferences Gets Big 
Support, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at 16.  In April 2014, a survey by MTV of 14-
24 year-old millennials’ found significant majorities of both young white people 
(74%) and people of color (65%) opposed preferential treatment given to one 
race over another, regardless of historical inequalities.  MTV STRATEGIC 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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INSIGHTS & DAVID BINDER RES., BIAS SURVEY SUMMARY 4 (2014), available at 
http://cdn.lookdifferent.org/content/studies/000/000/001/DBR_MTV_Bias_Sur
vey_Executive_Summary.pdf?1398858309. 
 
Public polling of attitudes toward affirmative action is heavily influenced by 
how the question is phrased.  Four national polls, conducted from May through 
June of 2013, yielded disparate results, which are compared below: 
 
Table B: Summary of Polls and Surveys 
Poll Question Response 
Margin 
of 
Error 
Sample 
Size 
NYT- 
CBS 
Do you favor or oppose affirmative 
action programs for minorities in 
hiring, promoting and college 
admissions? 
Favor 53% 
Oppose 
38% 
±3% 1,022 
NBC- 
WSJ 
Now let me read you two brief 
statements on affirmative action 
programs, and ask which one comes 
closer to your own point of view. 
A:  Affirmative action programs are 
still needed to counteract the effects of 
discrimination against minorities, and 
are a good idea as long as there are no 
rigid quotas. 
B:  Affirmative action programs have 
gone too far in favoring minorities, and 
should be ended because they unfairly 
discriminate against whites. 
A: 45% 
B: 45% 
±3.1% 1,000 
WaPo
- ABC 
Do you support or oppose allowing 
universities to consider applicants’ race 
as a factor in deciding which students 
to admit? 
Support 
22% 
Oppose 
76% 
±3.5% ≈1,000 
PRRI 
In  order  to  make  up  for  past  
discrimination,  do  you  favor  or  
oppose  programs  which  make  special 
efforts  to  help  blacks  and  other  
minorities  get  ahead? 
Do  you  think  blacks  and  other  
minorities  should  receive  preference  
in  college  admissions  to  make  up  for  
past  inequalities,  or  not? 
Favor 68% 
Oppose 
24% 
 
Yes 29% 
No 64% 
±3.1% 1,000 
 
PUB. RELIGION RES. INST., PRRI RELIGION AND POLITICS TRACKING POLL (2013), 
available at http://publicreligion.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/May-
Religion-Politics-Topline1.pdf; America’s Views on the Issues, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/06/us/new-york-times-cbs-news-
poll-june-2013.html?_r=1& (last updated June 6, 2013); Domenico Montanaro, 
NBC News/WSJ Poll:  Affirmative Action Support at Historic Low, NBC NEWS 
19
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opponents have found success taking their grievance-oriented 
message directly to the electorate.64  In this regard, they have 
been aided by a powerful but misplaced force, the “false burden-
bearer” effect. 
 
2. False Victim Effect 
 
According to a 1995 California poll that found strong public 
support for banning race-based preferences (71.7% in favor 
versus 21.6% against), more than half of the respondents said 
they personally knew someone who was hurt by affirmative 
action, and nearly three-fifths said they did not know anyone 
who was helped.65  Proposition 209 was approved the following 
year.  The public’s perception is distorted by the lack of accurate 
information about affirmative action, whose adverse impact is 
often greatly overstated.66 
 
(June 11, 2013 4:41 AM), 
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/11/18885926-nbc-newswsj-poll-
affirmative-action-support-at-historic-low; Post-ABC Poll: Same-Sex Marriage 
and Affirmative Action, WASH. POST (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/06/11/ 
National-Politics/Polling/question_11128.xml?uuid=-Z5dxtKlEeKzojv16ze5 
0A. In these polls, public support for affirmative action tends to be stronger 
when the program is described as broadly helping minorities, as shown in the 
New York Times/CBS News (“NYT-CBS”) poll.  The NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal (“NBC-WSJ”) poll, which shows an even split over continuing or 
ending affirmative action, found support for continuing it at a historic low.  The 
Washington Post/ABC (“WaPo-ABC”) poll, which specifically asked about 
universities’ consideration of race in the admission process, drew majority 
opposition from whites, blacks, and Hispanics.  The dichotomy in attitude 
toward helping minorities “get ahead” and giving race-based preferences in 
admissions is vividly captured in the Public Religion Research Institute 
(“PRRI”) poll, which found 68% supporting the former and 64% opposing the 
latter (including 57% who had supported the first question).  This disparity is 
also reflected in other polls regarding affirmative action over the past decade.  
In short, the public appears to be much more sensitive about race-based 
preferences in admissions than other types of affirmative action programs. 
64. Two weeks after the Supreme Court released the Gratz and Grutter 
decisions in June 2003, Jennifer Gratz and Barbara Grutter launched the 
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative.  See Ward Connerly, Taking it to Michigan, 
NAT’L REV. (July 8, 2003), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/207428/taking-it-michigan/ward-
connerly. 
65. NICOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
MERITOCRACY 294 (1999). 
66. When asked how often affirmative action programs that are designed 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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As an initial matter, race plays no role in the admissions 
outcomes at over 60% of America’s colleges.67  A 2003 survey of 
chief admission officers found that while 68% of schools were 
guided by mission statements that encourage racial diversity, 
only one-third actually considered race or ethnicity as a factor in 
admissions.68  Only at the highly selective schools, which reject 
a significant portion of their applicants, could racial-preferences 
be used to displace or “hurt” certain applicants from non-favored 
groups.69 
Some of the most selective and prestigious schools may 
consider race but need not actually use it as a plus factor because 
they can achieve on-campus diversity entirely through 
underrepresented minority applicants who have sufficiently 
strong credentials to be accepted without the extra boost. 70  
These students (the “unassisted minority admits”) are among 
the most sought after in American higher education.  Due to the 
achievement gap, however, there is a shortage of such 
applicants, so many selective schools must resort to the race-
plus factor to admit other underrepresented minority students 
(the “race-plus admits”) to assemble what they consider to be 
 
to help women and minorities get better jobs and education “end up depriving 
someone else of their rights[,]” 34% of respondents said “almost always” or 
“quite a lot[,]” 47% said “occasionally” and 9% said “almost never.”  See Savage, 
supra note 63. 
67 . See Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College 
Admissions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 971, 977-78 (1998) (“At the least selective 60 
percent of colleges, being black or Hispanic had little effect on an applicant’s 
chances of admissions.”); see also Dennis J. Shields, Some Observations about 
Grutter, JURIST ONLINE SYMP. (Sept. 5, 2003), available at 
www.jurist.org/forum/symposium-aa/. 
68 . NAT’L ASS’N FOR COLLEGE ADMISSION COUNSELING, DIVERSITY AND 
COLLEGE ADMISSION IN 2003: A SURVEY REPORT XI (2003), available at 
http://www.nacacnet.org/issues-action/policy/Documents/Diversity%20Report 
%20Web.pdf. 
69. See Kane, supra note 67, at 971 (noting that only schools in the top 
one-fifth in academic selectivity deny significant proportions of their 
applicants); see also NAT’L ASS’N FOR COLLEGE ADMISSION COUNSELING, supra 
note 68, at 12 (Among schools “perceived as more selective in the admission 
process[,]” about half reported considering race as a factor.). 
70. In Grutter, Justice Kennedy noted the same in his dissent: “About 80% 
to 85% of the places in the entering class are given to applicants in the upper 
range of Law School Admissions Test scores and grades. An applicant with 
these credentials likely will be admitted without consideration of race or 
ethnicity.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
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meaningful minority representation on campus.71   Currently, 
there is virtually no publicly available information about the 
extent to which schools rely on the race-plus factor to achieve 
their desired level of campus diversity.72 
What is not in doubt is that at schools where affirmative 
action is instituted, race-plus admits are relatively few in 
number compared to the rest of the applicant pool.  Consider the 
Michigan Law School, which accepted 1,249 applicants including 
170 underrepresented minority students to fill about 400 spaces 
in the incoming class in 2000. 73   According to the expert 
testimony for the Law School at trial in Grutter, if race had not 
been considered, the school could only have admitted 46 
underrepresented minority applicants, which means the 
remaining 124 (out of the 170) were race-plus admits.74  Among 
the former, 16 enrolled and among the latter, 42 did.75  Thus, 
only 124 out of 3,432 applicants overall actually received the 
race-plus boost (a mere 3.6%), and the 42 matriculants among 
them more than tripled the underrepresented minority student 
presence (from 16 to 58). 
Diversity comes at the expense of those applicants of non-
favored groups who, in the absence of racial preferences, would 
 
71. According to Michigan Law School’s former Director of Admissions, 
Allan Stillwagon, about half of the minority applicants admitted in the 1989-
90 application cycle were chosen based on “the numbers” – meaning their LSAT 
score and undergraduate grade point average, as well as other interesting 
qualities – and the other half were chosen through the race-conscious 
admissions policy adopted to increase minority enrollment.  Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 830 (E.D. Mich. 2001).  Thus, half of the 
admitted minority students were unassisted minority whose admission did not 
require racial preferences and did not displace anyone else on the basis of race.  
Id. 
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319-20, 333 (recognizing the need for a “critical 
mass” of minorities on campus to realize the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body). 
73. Id. at 383-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 
839 (summarizing the testimony of Dr. Stephen Raudenbush, the law school 
expert). The Law School enrolled 399 first year JD students in the fall of 2000.  
The University of Michigan - Ann Arbor Graduate-Professional Enrollment by 
Class Level and Gender for Term 1310 (Fall 2000), OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR, 
UNIV. OF MICH. (2001), available at www.ro.umich.edu/report/00fa113.pdf. 
74. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (summarizing the testimony of Dr. 
Stephen Raudenbush, the law school expert). 
75. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320 (referring to Dr. Raudenbush’s testimony). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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have been admitted. 76   Only these displaced applicants (the 
“would-be admits”) can legitimately claim to have been 
burdened by affirmative action in admissions.77  The Law School 
estimates that had race not been a factor, only about 80 other 
applicants would have been accepted.78  It may seem odd that 
the acceptance of 124 race-plus admits would displace only 80 
applicants from non-favored groups.  This is so because 
underrepresented minority applicants tend to have more schools 
to choose from and have lower admissions yield than the average 
applicant. 79  If the Law School could not consider race, it would 
have needed to accept about 80 non-minority applicants to fill 
those 42 spaces.  Those 80 rejected applicants bore the entire 
displacement burden of affirmative action at the Michigan Law 
School in 2000.  Their rejection allowed about 400 incoming 
students at the Law School to partake in a diverse learning 
environment.80 
With 91% of the Law School’s students reporting favorably 
about diversity in the Gallup survey, we can deduce the number 
of self-reported beneficiaries to be about 360.  By this count, the 
actual beneficiaries were four and a half times as numerous as 
the actual burden-bearers (360:80).81   The 80 or so would-be 
admits comprised just 3.7% of the 2,183 applicants rejected by 
 
76. William Bowen and Derek Bok call the assisted minority admitted 
students “retrospectively rejected” admits.  WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, 
THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN 
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 18 (1999); see also Goodwin Liu, The 
Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002). 
77. The displacement burden discussed in this article is distinct from 
other burdens, such as the burdens of stigmatization and mismatch, which are 
felt by the underrepresented minority students.  See infra note 167. 
78. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-241). 
79. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 831 (E.D. Mich. 2000) 
(noting that most competitive underrepresented minority applicants are also 
highly recruited by other selective schools); Liu, supra note 76, at 1075, 1106 
(discussing data from Bowen and Bok’s study). 
80. In the early 2000s, the Michigan Law School enrolled about 400 JD 
students each year. See Enrollment Reports - 113: Graduate-Professional 
Enrollment by School or College, Class Level and Gender, OFFICE OF THE 
REGISTRAR, UNIV. OF MICH., 
http://ro.umich.edu/enrollment/enrollment.php?limit=none#r113 (last visited 
May 31, 2015). 
81. See Orfield & Whitla, supra note 52, at 160. 
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the Law School, which means the overwhelming majority of the 
rejected applicants was not affected by affirmative action. 82  
They would not have been admitted even if the admissions 
review process had been race-blind since those 42 places would 
have been filled by the would-be admits ahead of them. 
Yet many rejected applicants are unaware of this fact 
because Michigan Law School, like all other schools with the 
Grutter regime, does not distinguish the would-be admits from 
other rejected applicants.83  Many in the latter group also have 
superior applicant credentials than some of the race-plus admits 
and could reasonably believe that their admissions outcomes 
were adversely affected by affirmative action. 84   Since they 
would not have been admitted irrespective of racial preferences, 
their belief of having been burdened is misguided and they are 
the “false burden-bearers.” 
The false burden-bearers among the 2,183 rejected 
applicants could easily outnumber the 360 actual beneficiaries 
and even invert the favorable ratio of beneficiaries to would-be 
admits.  The misplaced belief of being harmed by racial 
preferences (the “false victim effect”) helps to account for why 
anti-affirmative action initiatives receive strong voter support.85  
The growth of applications at selective schools can exacerbate 
the false victim effect even as the underlying scale of the race-
conscious admissions program remains unchanged.  From 1997 
to 2005, the number of applications Michigan Law School 
received grew from 3,429 to 5,523,86 and the number of rejected 
 
82. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1095. 
83. Goodwin Liu refers to this reaction as legitimizing “the instinct – 
against all odds – to blame affirmative action.”  See id. at 1060. 
84. In response to arguments that there is “overwhelming support by the 
students at Harvard and University of Michigan’s Law Schools for maintaining 
the diversity program,” Justice Scalia noted that the people to talk to are “the 
high school seniors who have seen . . . people visibly less qualified than they 
are get into prestigious institutions where they are rejected.  If you think that 
is not creating resentment, you are just wrong.” See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 51-52, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
85. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1050 (“Claims of displacement tend to 
inflate the degree of racial conflict inherent in race-conscious admissions, 
thereby heightening the pressure to be ‘for’ or ‘against’ affirmative action.”). 
86. For the University of Michigan Law School’s Admissions page from 
March 8, 2005, see Admissions: About the School, U. MICH. L. SCH., 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050308020909/http://www.law.umich.edu/prosp
ectivestudents/admissions/index.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
  
2014 PROTECTING DIVERSITY IN THE IVORY TOWER 685 
applicants doubled to 4,400. 87   The number of false-burden 
bearers can rise sharply, irrespective of how many applicants 
are actually displaced.88 
Thomas Kane calls the false victim effect the “perceived 
cost” of affirmative action.89  Writing in 1998, he predicted that 
when the “pedagogical benefits racial diversity produced on 
campus are being compared with a perceived cost that is likely 
to be exaggerated . . . the political process is likely to 
underprovide diversity on campus.”90  If the public had a more 
accurate accounting of the beneficiaries and actual burden-
bearers, then diversity through affirmative action ought to be a 
consistent electoral winner rather than a political liability. 
Supporters of affirmative action, in their effort to explain 
the unlikelihood of being burdened by race-based preferences, 
have unwittingly contributed to the false victim effect.  Derek 
Bok points out that empty handicap spaces in a crowded parking 
lot may tempt drivers, but without the handicap sign, the spaces 
would not be empty.91  Similarly, he reasons, the chance that a 
typical rejected applicant of getting admitted to the seat taken 
by a race-plus admit is “vanishingly small” because there are 
many other even more competitive rejected applicants.  In her 
dissent in Gratz, Justice Ginsberg cites Goodwin Liu who 
explains that race-conscious programs do not “unduly constrict” 
admissions opportunities for students of non-favored groups, 
because at selective schools “where applicants greatly 
 
87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 383-85 tbl. 1-3 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
88. At Michigan Law School, as with most selective schools, the size of the 
enrolled class and the critical mass of minority students therein fluctuate 
slightly from year to year so the ratio of actual beneficiaries to burden-bearers 
(would-be admits) should also remain stable. For annual Law School 
enrollment data, see supra note 80. For ethnicity data, see Ethnicity Reports - 
836G: Graduate Enrollment by School or College, Ethnicity, Class Level and 
Gender with Rackham Students Assigned According to Field of Specialization, 
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR, UNIV. OF MICH., available at 
http://ro.umich.edu/enrollment/ethnicity.php?limit=none#r836G (last visited 
May 31, 2015).  See also id. 
89. Kane, supra note 67, at 993. 
90. Id. 
91. On Air Interview with Derek Bok, Harvard Univ., on PBS Frontline: 
Secrets of the SATs (1999), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/interviews/bok.html (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
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outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly 
outnumber minority applicants, substantial preferences for 
minority applicants will not significantly diminish the odds of 
admission facing white applicants.”92   Such characterizations 
attempt to reduce the magnitude of the burden through 
probabilistic terms but also spread the burden much more 
widely. 
When Bok and William Bowen say the elimination of 
affirmative action would increase the chances of white students 
to gain admission very slightly, from 25% to 26.5%, they imply 
that every applicant of a non-favored race is in fact burdened by 
racial preferences, but only by a little.93  This argument supports 
the Grutter majority’s view that the Grutter regime “does not 
unduly harm nonminority applicants,” but is unlikely to 
persuade to disappointed applicants and their sympathizers.94 
For the actually displaced, the impact of race-plus 
preference on their odds of admission was not 1.5% but 100%. 
Even Liu’s careful study concludes that there are applicants who 
are in fact displaced by affirmative action and can legitimately 
claim to have been burdened.95  Since these would-be admits are 
not known, a much larger set of the rejected pool can claim to be 
harmed.96  Hence, the more broadly the burden of affirmative 
 
92 . See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 768 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(Clay, J., concurring) (discussing Goodwin Liu’s study and concluding that “‘the 
Barbara Grutters of our society’ have no reason to claim that anything has 
been ‘taken’ from them by virtue of the law school’s admission policy.”); Liu, 
supra note 76, at 1049. 
93. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003), (No. 02-241) (counsel for respondents indicating that eliminating 
racial preferences would have increased the chance of other applicant 
admissions by approximately five percent). 
94. See id. at 53 (counsel for respondents describing the displacement 
effect of affirmative action as “a very small and diffuse burden.”); BOWEN & 
BOK, supra note 76, at 26, 36. 
95. Liu, supra note 76, at 1050, 1092. 
96. In making this appeal against affirmative action, Roger Clegg casts 
the burdens of race-based preferences broadly: 
 
Considering [that] over 3,500 individual nonblack students 
were rejected [at four public university medical schools over 
a two-year period] despite having better MCAT scores and 
undergraduate grades than the median black students 
accepted. Multiply this by the number of medical schools in 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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action is said to be distributed, the greater numbers of no votes 
will be drawn against affirmative action on Election Day.  For 
supporters of affirmative action, it is preferable to confine the 
burden-bearers to their actual numbers than to inflate the false 
burden effect.97 
 
3. Lack of Progress Toward the Narrowing of the 
Achievement Gap 
 
Grutter calls for reducing and eventually eliminating the 
need for affirmative action in admissions, but made no effort to 
monitor progress on this front or assess the efficacy of the 
schools’ efforts toward this goal.  More than a decade onward, 
the schools have disclosed scarcely little about how their 
programs are working and the public sees few signs of progress 
in achievement gap. 
The Court did not impose any oversight requirement on the 
schools practicing the Grutter program when it easily could have 
done so.98  Having granted schools a 25-year period in which to 
operate conforming affirmative action programs, it would not 
have been onerous to require the schools to report, for example, 
the number of times in each application cycle the race-plus factor 
was used.  The schools, having been shielded from legal 
 
the country . . . and multiply that times all the years that 
these preferences have been awarded — and you [have to] 
conclude that there have been a lot of victims of 
discrimination. 
 
Roger Clegg, Bad Medicine, Coast to Coast: What Quotas Do to Education, 
NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 14, 2001), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120924123136/http://old.nationalreview.com/con
tributors/clegg061401.shtml.  See also Thomas Kane, The Long Road to Race 
Blindness, SCIENCE, Oct. 24, 2003, available at 
http://sciencecareers.sciencemag.org/career_magazine/previous_issues/article
s/2003_10_31/nodoi.17412015748349963458 (“A large fraction of [rejected 
applicants] may well believe that they would have been accepted if Harvard 
had no racial preferences.”). 
97. Also, a school has greater control over which applicants it accepts than 
which and how many applicants choose to apply. 
98. Affirmative action programs designed to remedy past discrimination 
are generally “subject to continuing oversight” to ensure that they “work the 
least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit.”  
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003). 
27
  
688 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:2 
challenges, would have little to lose by disclosing this statistic. 
Since schools must review each application individually, they 
can readily tabulate how many minority applicants they admit 
each year with and without the race-plus factor. 
Race-plus usage figures would give the public a much better 
picture of the scale of affirmative action in higher education.99  
Actual race-plus usage statistics can help dispel the false victim 
effect and gauge efforts to narrow the achievement gap.  
Comparisons could be made across schools and over time.  The 
absence of any such disclosure combined with indirect evidence 
that the achievement gap remains unchanged undermines 
public confidence in the ability of the Grutter regime to work as 
the Supreme Court had intended. 
The gaps in college entrance exam scores across racial 
groups remain largely unchanged in the decade since Grutter.  
On the SAT-I reasoning test, the average scores of Native 
American, Hispanic and black students in 2003 were, 
respectively, 101, 151 and 206 points below that of white 
students, who averaged 1063 on the 1600-point math and verbal 
sections.100  In 2014, those gaps were, respectively, 96, 153 and 
203 points.101  The absolute scores of these underrepresented 
minority groups show negligible improvement.  In those eleven 
years, black students gained three points, Native American 
students fell by five points, and Hispanic scores fell by two 
points. 102   The only racial group to show sustained gains is 
Asian-American, a racial minority that is generally not 
considered underrepresented in higher education.  Asian-
American students outscored white students by 20 points on the 
SAT-I in 2003 and 58 points in 2014 (1121 vs. 1063).103 
 
99. Cf. William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates Built-In 
Headwinds: An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 131, 204-05 & nn. 310-12 (2002) (on the need for better data). 
100. See supra Figure 1 and accompanying note. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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Figure 1: SAT Reasoning & Math Scores by Race/Ethnicity 
(1992-2013)104 
 
 
 
The American Achievement Test (ACT), unlike the SAT, is 
a more knowledge-based exam that is less susceptible to 
criticisms of testing bias, but the trendlines in the achievement 
gap are the same.  In 2003, on the ACT, Native American, 
Hispanic and black students scored respectively, 3.0, 3.2 and 4.8 
points below white students who averaged 21.7 on the 36-point 
 
104 . Source Data: COLLEGEBOARD, COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS TOTAL 
GROUP PROFILE REPORT, COLLEGE BOARD (1992-2014).  Explanatory notes for 
the SAT-I data: (a) The College Board presents Hispanic student scores in 
three sub-groups: Mexican-American, Puerto Rican and Other Latino and the 
Hispanic data points in this graph are based on weighted averages of these 
sub-groups. (b) This graph does not show the scores of those students 
categorized as “Other” or “No Response” by the College Board.  (c) The 
noticeable dip in the mean score of all students from 2005 (1028) to 2006 (1007) 
was driven in large part by a sharp decline in the scores of students who 
declined to self-report their race/ethnicity. The percentage such test-takers 
rose from 7.9% in 1992 to 25.3% in 2003 and fell to 3.8% in 2013.  (d) The 1992 
SAT-I scores are reported based on the re-centered scale set by the College 
Board in 1995. 
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scale.105  By 2014, those same gaps had widened, respectively, to 
4.3, 3.5 and 5.3 points.106  Over those 11 years, the ACT scores 
of Hispanic students rose by 0.3 points, those of black students 
gained one-tenth of a point, and Native American student scores 
fell by 0.7 points. 107   Asian-American students showed 
noticeable improvement; their mean score overtook that of white 
students for the first time in 2003 and improved by 1.7 points to 
23.5 in 2014.108 
 
Figure 2: ACT Composite Scores by Race/Ethnicity (1997-
2014)109 
 
 
105. See infra Figure 2 and accompanying note. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. ACT,  PROFILE REPORT – NATIONAL: SECTION I, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(2014), available at www.act.org/newsroom/data/2014/pdf/profile/Section1.pdf; 
ACT, PROFILE REPORT – NATIONAL: SECTION I, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009), 
available at www.act.org/newsroom/data/2009/pdf/one.pdf; ACT, PROFILE 
REPORT – NATIONAL: SECTION I, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007), available at 
http://www.act.org/newsroom/data/2007/pdf/one.pdf; ACT, PROFILE REPORT – 
NATIONAL: SECTION I, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2006), available at 
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The conspicuous score gaps at the national level are even 
more pronounced among applicants to selective schools.  Thomas 
Espenshade and Alexandra Radford’s study of 1997 admissions 
statistics from selective private schools found the race-plus boost 
for black applicants were equal to 310 points on the SAT-I 
compared to whites. 110   Hispanic applicants enjoy a smaller 
boost of 130 points while Asian-Americans had to outscore their 
white counterparts by an average of 140 points to have the same 
chance to be admitted. 111   A study of Duke University 
admissions statistics from 2001 and 2002 found Asian American 
students who enrolled averaged 1457 on the SAT-I, compared to 
1416 for white, 1347 for Hispanic and 1275 for black students.112 
Asian-Americans, who are often admitted at lower rates than 
whites by selective schools, have begun to challenge this “race-
minus” treatment.113 
The depth and persistence of the achievement gap suggests 
that selective schools are failing the acid test.114  Their race-
 
http://www.act.org/newsroom/data/2006/pdf/one.pdf. 
110. See Thomas J. Espenshade & Alexandria Walton Radford, A New 
Manhattan Project, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 12, 2009), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2009/11/12/radford (providing a review 
on THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO LONGER 
SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND 
CAMPUS LIFE (1999)). 
111. Id. 
112. See Peter Arcidiacono et al., What Happens After Enrollment? An 
Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in GPA and Major Choice, IZA 
J. LAB. ECON. 1, 34 (2012).  For a data set description, see ANITA-YVONNE 
BRYANT ET AL., DUKE UNIV., THE CAMPUS LIFE AND LEARNING PROJECT: A 
REPORT ON THE FIRST TWO COLLEGE YEARS 8 (2006). 
113. See, e.g., Michael Wang, Asian-Americans and SCA-5: Here’s Why 
Many Oppose It, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 17, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26159971/asian-americans-and-sca-
5-heres-why-many; Amanda Paulson, Why Are Asian Students Suing Harvard 
for Affirmative Action Policies? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2014/1118/Why-are-Asian-
students-suing-Harvard-for-affirmative-action-policies-video. 
114. For the persistence of score gaps on graduate school admissions tests, 
see AAMC, USING MCAT DATA IN MEDICAL STUDENT SELECTION 2 (2013); LSAC, 
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL: LSAT TECHNICAL REPORT 12-03 27 (2012); 
SUSAN P. DALESSANDRO ET AL., LSAC, LSAT PERFORMANCE WITH REGIONAL, 
GENDER, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS: 2005–2006 THROUGH 2011–2012 
TESTING YEARS (2012); The Widening Racial Scoring Gap on Standardized 
Tests for Admission to Graduate School, J. BLACKS HIGHER ED. (2006), 
http://www.jbhe.com/news_views/51_graduate_admissions_test.html (last 
31
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conscious admissions programs have not brought about 
noticeable improvements in academic performance of 
underrepresented minority students nationally, and there is 
little evidence that they have become less dependent on the race-
plus factor to create diversity on campus.  These developments 
give additional motivation to affirmative action’s critics, who are 
convincing the public that the use of race in admissions will not 
diminish naturally and must be voted down.115 
 
4. Implicit Race Norming Effect 
 
The stubborn persistence of the achievement gap also fuels 
criticism that race-conscious admissions programs are 
perpetuating instead of addressing the problem.  By admitting 
some underrepresented minority applicants at lower admissions 
thresholds, selective schools are said to diminish the incentive of 
these students to score higher.  The practice of race-norming in 
employment or comparing and evaluating job candidates only 
among members of that candidate’s racial group is prohibited by 
the Civil Rights Act of 1990.116  What many selective schools 
have apparently done is to admit a nearly-fixed quantum of top 
applicants from each race, irrespective of whether some of the 
top applicants of one race or ethnic group are competitive with 
the rejected candidates of another group.117  Justice Thomas, in 
 
visited May 31, 2015). 
115. See David Savage, Affirmative Action Case Splits Asian Americans, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/30/nation/na-
affirm30; Scott Jaschik, Too Asian?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 10, 2006), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/10/10/asian. 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2012) (prohibiting the “use [of] different 
cutoffs scores for . . .  employment related tests on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
117 . Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his Grutter dissent, observed that 
applicants of different racial groups who had similar grades and test scores 
were admitted at different rates.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 382 (2003) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The notable gains in Asian American test scores 
in the face of overall score stagnation over the past decade and the “race-minus 
factor” of 140 points that Asian American applicants reportedly face at certain 
selective schools also support the implicit race-norming hypothesis. When 
Asian American applicants are compared against each other by the admissions 
committees, they are pressed to outscore members of their own racial group 
and driven to improve their academic credentials irrespective of how their non-
Asian peers perform.  See Ethan Bonner, Asian-Americans in the Argument, 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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his dissent, explains how the practice can dent incentives for 
higher minority achievement and allow different groups to settle 
into different score thresholds: 
 
An applicant’s LSAT score can improve 
dramatically with preparation, but such 
preparation [carry] a cost, and there must be 
sufficient benefits attached to an improved score 
to justify additional study. Whites scoring 
between 163 and 167 on the LSAT are routinely 
rejected by the [Michigan] Law School, and thus 
whites aspiring to admission at the Law School 
have every incentive to improve their score to 
levels above that range. [Noting that in 2000, 209 
out of 422 whites were rejected in this range.]  
Blacks, on the other hand, were nearly 
guaranteed admission if they score above 155. 
[Noting that in 2000, 63 out of 77 black applicants 
were accepted with LSAT scores above 155.]  As 
admission prospects approach certainty, there is 
no incentive for the black applicant to continue to 
prepare for the LSAT once he is reasonably 
assured of achieving the requisite score.118 
 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/education/edlife/affirmative-action-a-
complicated-issue-for-asian-americans.html?_r=0 (quoting a former 
admissions officer at Wesleyan, Brown and Columbia: “The bar is different for 
every group.”) For example, a score of 600 on the SAT-I math section ranks at 
the 75th percentile among all test-takers and would place at the 94th 
percentile among black students, 91th among Mexican-Americans, 90th among 
Puerto Ricans, 89th among other Hispanics, 85th among Native Americans, 
and 71st among whites, but only 46th among Asian-Americans.  See COLLEGE 
BOARD, SAT PERCENTILE RANKS 2014 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS -- CRITICAL 
READING, MATHEMATICS, AND WRITING PERCENTILE RANKS (2014), available at 
https://secure-media.collegeboard.org/digitalServices/pdf/sat/sat-percentile-
ranks-crit-reading-math-writing-2014.pdf; COLLEGE BOARD, SAT PERCENTILE 
RANKS FOR 2014 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: CRITICAL READING, MATHEMATICS, 
AND WRITING PERCENTILE RANKS BY GENDER AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2014), 
available at https://secure-media.collegeboard.org/digitalServices/pdf/sat/sat-
percentile-ranks-gender-ethnicity-2014.pdf. Thus, when a score that is better 
than three-quarters of the field is nevertheless below the median for one racial 
group, race norming can create uneven incentives for individuals, and lead to 
greater disparity in outcomes across racial groups. 
118. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Thomas qualifies his statement somewhat by noting that 
it is uncertain whether the test-taker’s behavior is responsive to 
admissions policies, but his point holds a degree of intuitive 
appeal and may draw on anecdotal support.119 
The very notable shortage of high scoring black students on 
admissions tests is difficult to explain with historical or socio-
economic factors.  In 2003, some 1,877 black students scored 
1300 or higher on the SAT-I, accounting for just 1.5% of all black 
students who took the test.120  This ratio is well below the 10% 
of all scores above 1300, achieved by 148,024 test takers.121  Out 
of the 13,897 who scored above 1500, only 72 were black 
students.122  The 192 black students with 1450 or better SAT 
scores could comprise the critical mass at just one selective 
school.123 
Given the scarcity of high scoring black students, selective 
colleges must inevitably admit others with lower scores, who 
still rank near the top of the black applicant pool.  With their 
chances for admission already very high, the students of this 
second tier have few reasons to improve their credentials 
further.  After all, there is no difference in admissions outcome 
between a race-plus admit and an unassisted minority admit.  
Both get in.  The regime upheld in Grutter presents no incentives 
for schools to convert the former into the latter. 
 
119. At the Grutter trial, Jay Rosner, a director of the Princeton Review 
Foundation, testified that minorities are often unaware of the benefits of test 
preparation services and enroll in much smaller numbers than whites.  Rosner 
had trouble filling a 15-seat LSAT preparation course at Howard University, a 
predominantly black institution, even though the course fee was discounted 
from the customary $1,000 to $200.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 
861 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
120. Michael Dobbs, At Colleges, an Affirmative Reaction: After Rulings, 
Recruiters Take a More Inclusive Approach to Diversity, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 
2003, at A01. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
     123. When Grutter was decided in 2003, Harvard College, whose 
admissions plan had been so influential to Justice Powell, accepted 200 black 
students into its Class of 2007.  See Class of ‘07 Selected from Pool of Over 
20,000: Considered the Most Competitive in Harvard’s History, HARV. GAZETTE 
(Apr. 3, 2003), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/04.03/01-
admissions.html. 
 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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Whether the lack of incentives to boost minority high scores 
actually perpetuates the achievement gap is often lost in the fray 
of the public political debate.  On the eve of Proposal 2 vote in 
Michigan, the Center for Equal Opportunity, an anti-affirmative 
action organization, reported that the median SAT-I scores of 
black students admitted to the University of Michigan’s main 
undergraduate college in 2005 was 1160, compared to 1260 for 
Hispanics, 1350 for whites and 1400 for Asian-Americans.124  As 
with other contested issues in this debate, the shift in venue 
from litigation to political referendum has effectively reversed 
the burden of proof.  Instead of opponents of affirmative action 
having to prove their doubts in a court of law, supporters must 
work to disprove or dispel the doubt in the public mind.  The 
current Grutter regime is poorly designed to respond to the 
charge of race-norming. 
 
C. Addressing Grutter’s Shortcomings 
 
Affirmative action’s supporters can ill-afford to stand 
behind Grutter and ignore the opponents’ reasoned and 
unreasoned criticism.  They must address Grutter’s weaknesses 
and modify the regime to save it from the onslaught of ballot 
initiatives and renewed litigation.  They must put forward a 
stronger and more convincing showing of diversity’s benefits to 
the broader public.  They can no longer dismiss the grievances 
of those claiming to be burdened by affirmative action, but 
should seek to accommodate those actually burdened.  Just as a 
distinction should be made between real and false burden-
bearers, so too should the unassisted minority admits be 
distinguished from the race-plus admits.  The admissions 
process should provide incentives for the latter to improve their 
credentials and join the ranks of the former.  Only then can a 
race-conscious admissions system begin to satisfy the acid test 
of the Grutter majority and work to narrow the achievement gap.  
As increasing numbers of minority applicants become 
competitive with the rest of the admitted applicant pool, the 
practice of race norming will disappear. 
 
124. Scott Jaschik, New Salvos on Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER ED. 
(Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/10/17/mich. 
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Two keys are critical to correcting the flaws of Grutter.  The 
first is disclosure of the frequency of race-plus usage, which 
would reveal the limited scale of race-based admissions 
preferences and provide a means for public oversight.125  The 
second is a workable mechanism that can be used to 
accommodate the would-be admits or otherwise address their 
concerns.  When the public is informed of the true extent of 
affirmative action in higher education and is assured that those 
actually burdened by the race-based preferences are 
accommodated, the false burden-bearer effect will dissipate. 
Disclosing race-plus statistics is relatively straightforward, 
but accommodating the burden-bearers requires a closer 
accounting of the benefits of diversity against the burdens of 
affirmative action.  Grutter’s rough cost-benefit analysis, which 
broadly endorsed the claimed benefits of diversity and generally 
dismissed the burdens complained by the critics, is plainly 
inadequate.  It inflamed the critics and deprived supporters of 
the proof they need in the political arena. 
 
IV.     Benefits and Burdens 
 
A. Benefits 
 
According to various social science studies, students who 
interact in and outside the classroom with peers of diverse 
backgrounds show greater active thinking, intellectual growth 
and respect for group differences than those who do not. 126  
 
125 . See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow 
Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 580 (2007) (calling for 
greater transparency in the way affirmative action programs operate so the 
public is better informed). 
126. See EMILY J. SHAW, COLLEGEBOARD, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 2005-4: 
RESEARCHING THE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY 7, 11 (2005), available 
at https://research.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/publications/2012/7/ 
researchreport-2005-4-researching-educational-benefits-diversity.pdf. A 
survey of undergraduates at 349 institutions found that students at liberal arts 
colleges are more likely to engage in diversity-related activities, and that these 
students were also more likely to take on greater academic challenges, engage 
in collaborative learning activities, and report greater personal growth and 
satisfaction in their college experience.  Id. at 10-11(study of 1,258 engineering 
students finding students in racially-diverse classrooms reported slightly 
higher but significant gains in their group-problem solving abilities); see also 
Paul D. Umbach & George D. Kuh, Student Experiences with Diversity at 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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These can habits help prepare them to live, work, and lead in a 
diverse and multifaceted world.127  The Grutter majority agreed 
that these benefits then redound to the greater good of the 
country, but Justices Scalia and Thomas were among those 
unconvinced and critical of the majority’s deferential acceptance 
of the Law School and amici’s description of diversity’s benefits. 
To Justice Scalia, the benefits are akin to kindergarten 
lessons in getting along, which are unworthy of special 
government endorsement. 128   For many young Americans, 
however, college or graduate school is their first opportunity to 
have meaningful interactions with members of another race or 
ethnicity.129  Justice Thomas ridicules elite schools for following 
a “faddish slogan of the cognoscenti” to achieve a certain 
classroom “aesthetic” with students of different color.130  He is 
partially right – the mere diversity of students on campus, or 
“structural diversity,” is necessary but not sufficient to create 
educational benefits. 131   There needs to be meaningful 
interaction among students and engagement by faculty to 
expand educational possibilities, stimulate critical thinking, and 
increase awareness of biases. 132   Only then could campus 
diversity begin to advance the students’ cognitive and personal 
 
Liberal Arts Colleges: Another Claim for Distinctiveness, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 
169 (2006). 
127. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“Major American 
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, 
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”); id. at 331 (“high-ranking retired officers and 
civilian leaders of the United States military assert that . . . a ‘highly qualified, 
racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its 
principle mission to provide national security.’” (citing Brief for Lt. Gen. Julius 
W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516)). 
128. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in judgment). 
129. The survey of Harvard and University of San Francisco medical 
students found that half did not have any meaningful contact with members of 
another race prior to college, but two-thirds did during college and 85% did in 
medical school.  See Whitla et al., supra note 62, at 460. 
130. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350, 354 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in judgment). 
131. See SHAW, supra note 126, at 4. 
132. See Matthew J. Mayhew & Heidi E. Grunwald, Factors Contributing 
to Faculty Incorporation of Diversity-Related Course Content, 77 J. HIGHER 
EDUC. 148 (2006) (examining how 336 faculty members incorporated diversity-
related content into their teaching). 
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growth and generate the kind of educational benefits that the 
Grutter majority found valuable. 
The litany studies offers glimpses of diversity at work, but 
there is no demonstration that every school with student body 
diversity is realizing diversity’s education potential. 133   The 
difficulty in assessing how much educational benefits are being 
produced prevents meaningful comparisons of race-conscious 
and race-neutral means to achieve diversity, the central 
conundrum in Fisher. 
 
B. Race Neutral Alternatives and Fisher 
 
For any affirmative action program to withstand judicial 
scrutiny, a state actor must show that the program is necessary 
to achieve the government’s compelling interest.134  Necessity is 
determined by comparing how well a race-neutral program 
would perform to meet the same interest. 135   The Grutter 
majority required schools to consider race-neutral means to 
generate the educational benefits of diversity, but was satisfied 
that none could do so “about as well” as Michigan Law School’s 
holistic review with the race-plus factor. 136   The Court 
considered this issue again ten years later in Fisher, and 
tightened the standard by requiring the schools to show that no 
“workable race-neutral alternatives” exist.137 
Among the most commonly considered race-neutral 
alternatives are socio-economic affirmative action and the so-
called percent plans.138  The former, which provides preferences 
 
133. Some within elite academic institutions are skeptical of the benefits 
of diversity.  See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Affirmative Reaction, AM. PROSPECT, 
(Feb. 19, 2003), http://www.prospect.org/article/affirmative-reaction (noting 
that many who defend affirmative action for the sake of diversity are actually 
motivated by their commitment to social justice and would do so “even if social 
science demonstrated unconvertible that diversity (or its absence) has no effect 
(or even a negative effect) on the learning environment.”). 
134. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2413 (2013); Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 326; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978). 
135. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40. 
136. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)). 
137. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2414. 
138 . See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, CENTURY 
FOUND., A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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on the basis of family income instead of race, has attracted 
growing public interest in recent years, but remains unproven 
as a stand-alone alternative because the achievement gap 
extends to lower income levels. 139   The latter has been 
implemented in Florida, Texas and California, and guarantees 
students who graduate in the top n percent of their high school 
class admission to their state’s flagship universities. 140   The 
Grutter majority was persuaded that the “percent plans” could 
not produce the same quality of educational benefits because 
they constrained the schools’ academic selectivity or its ability 
to choose students for their potential to contribute to campus 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL PREFERENCES 11-25 (2012), available at 
https://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf; Richard D. Kahlenberg, A New 
Affirmative Action Based On Class: Column, Supreme Court Ruling Opens 
Door to More Appropriate Approach, USA TODAY (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/24/richard-kahlenberg-on-
court-and-affirmative-action/2452375/. 
139. Whites and Asian-Americans from lower income brackets have on 
average outscored black test-takers from the highest income brackets.  See 
JBHE Found., Inc., News and Views: Why Family Income Differences Don’t 
Explain the Racial Gap in SAT Scores, 20 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 6 (1998); 
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the 
Innovative Deal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 989-90 (1996). In order to admit sufficient 
minority students under a race-blind class-conscious system to achieve 
existing “critical mass” levels, many schools would have to subject many more 
seats in the admitted class to low-income preferences.  See Kane, supra note 
67, at 992.  Kane found that blacks and Hispanics constituted only one out of 
every six high-scoring, low-income students, and so every race-plus preference 
replaced by “low-income plus” preference will, on average, yield one-sixth of a 
minority student.  Id.  To maintain critical mass levels of minority students, a 
school would have to expand the number of seats subject to the plus-factor by 
a factor of six.  Id.  While this change may help low-income students overall, it 
will displace large numbers of high-scoring, highly competitive middle and 
upper middle-class students, minorities among them.  Thus, the crux of the 
matter remains the dearth of competitive underrepresented minority 
applicants. Until their numbers grow sufficiently, schools will have difficulty 
finding any race-neutral category in which they are, but not a small minority. 
See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law 
School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1997) (concluding that 
using racial-neutral proxies, such as socioeconomic status, would not yield 
meaningfully diverse classes). 
140 . For the development of percent plans in Texas, Florida, and 
California, see Race-Neutral Alternatives in Postsecondary Education: 
Innovative Approaches to Diversity, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Mar. 2003), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/edlite-
raceneutralreport.html#_ftn63. 
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diversity.141  The Justices urged schools to continue searching 
for racial-neutral alternatives in preparation of affirmative 
action’s eventual sunset, but left for the schools to decide when 
they were ready to switch.142 
In Texas, where affirmative action was banned in 1995 by 
the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood and the state legislature enacted 
the Top 10% Law in 1997, Grutter allowed schools to reinstitute 
race-conscious admissions policies.143  The University of Texas 
at Austin (“UT-Austin”) added a race-conscious track with 
holistic individualized review modeled on Grutter to complement 
its race-neutral percent plan track for undergraduate 
admissions.144  By 2008, the race-neutral track accounted for 
81% of all Texas high school graduates enrolled in the freshman 
class, with the remaining 19.1% admitted through the race-
conscious track.145 
 
141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.  Justice Thomas equated selectivity with 
elitism.  Id. at 355-56.  At UT-Austin, with the percent plan filling up to 86% 
of the incoming class, the school was left with limited room to select other 
students who were deemed vital to the education mission, including athletes.  
Scott Jaschik, Texas Limits ‘10%’ Admissions, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (June 1, 
2009), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/06/01/texas.  In order to give 
schools greater selectivity, the state legislature modified the law in 2009 to cap 
enrollment based on the percent plan to 75% of in-state freshman.  See Jennifer 
R. Lloyd, UT Changes Admissions Guidelines For Top Students, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/UT-
changes-admissions-guidelines-for-top-students-3994871.php. 
142. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43 (“We take the Law School at its word that 
it would like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula and 
will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
143. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2013) (commonly known 
as the “Top Ten Percent Rule”); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 
1996).  Some schools, including Texas A&M at College Station and the 
University of Georgia, declined to reinstitute race-conscious admissions.  
Nancy G. McDuff & Halley Potter, Ensuring Diversity under Race-Neutral 
Admissions at the University of Georgia in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 124 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.) (2014); Ron Nissimov, 
A&M Defies Trend, Will Drop Race as Admissions Factor, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 
4, 2003), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1033586/posts. 
144. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224-25 (5th Cir. 
2011). 
145. UNIV. TEX. AT AUSTIN, TOP 10%: REPORT 11 8-9, TBL. 2, 2B (2008), 
available at www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-
Report11.pdf. 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
  
2014 PROTECTING DIVERSITY IN THE IVORY TOWER 701 
The Fisher plaintiffs challenged the necessity of UT-
Austin’s race-conscious review in the second track.  Since 
minority enrollment at UT-Austin under the percent plan had 
rebounded to pre-Hopwood levels, they contend that no further 
race-based preferences are needed to satisfy the government’s 
compelling interest in diversity.146  In the first appeal to the 
Fifth Circuit, UT-Austin asserted that the underrepresented 
minority students admitted through the race-neutral track were 
unevenly distributed among the school’s several colleges such 
that a large proportion of medium and small sized classes had 
few or no minority students, and some minority students felt 
isolated. 147   Judge Higginbotham, writing for the panel that 
upheld the school’s policy, agreed that only with the selectivity 
afforded by the race-conscious track could UT-Austin assemble 
the kind of campus diversity that could deliver something closer 
to the “full educational benefits of diversity.”148 
By a 9-7 vote, the Fifth Circuit declined to rehear the case 
en banc.149  In her dissent, Judge Jones criticized the panel for 
allowing the school to justify its policy based on minority student 
presence at the classroom level.150  Such a ruling rests on factual 
conditions that change from one semester to the next, and 
provides no standard to determine when the changes in 
classroom composition would warrant a different outcome. 151  
Moreover, on a racially-diverse campus, student interactions 
 
146 . Fisher, 631 F.3d at 242. Under the race-neutral percent plan, 
enrollment of underrepresented minority students eventually reached one-
fifth of the class at UT-Austin, returning to or, for some groups, exceeding pre-
Hopwood levels.  Id. at 242-43. 
147. Id. at 241 (“. . . although overall enrollment of minority students at 
UT rose significantly between 1996 and 2002, the Fall 2002 schedule contained 
more classes with zero or one African American or Hispanic students than had 
the Fall 1996 Schedule”); id. at 240 (comparing higher enrollment of Hispanic 
and black students at the Colleges for Social Work and Education to the 
College of Business Administration). 
148. Id. at 245. 
149. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 644 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 2012). 
150. Id. at 307 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“Will classroom diversity ‘suffer’ in 
areas like applied math, kinesiology, chemistry, Farsi, or hundreds of other 
subjects if, by chance, few or no students of a certain race are enrolled?”). 
151. The panel acknowledged that UT-Austin’s race-conscious admissions 
track cannot be “blessed … in perpetuity” and compared the situation to voter 
redistricting cases, which the court must periodically revisit. Fisher, 631 F.3d 
at 246. 
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and learning opportunities are not confined to the classroom, so 
the absence of minority students in certain classes should not 
necessarily mean that the government’s interest is frustrated.152 
The Supreme Court, by a 6-2 margin, vacated the judgment 
and remanded.153  Justice Kennedy, who authored the opinion, 
faults the Fifth Circuit for too readily deferring to UT-Austin’s 
claim of having considered race-neutral alternatives, and 
ordered a more stringent “assess[ment] of whether [UT-Austin] 
has offered sufficient evidence that would prove that its 
admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the 
educational benefits of diversity.”154  Justice Kennedy appears to 
wish for the lower court to delve deeply into the mechanics of the 
admissions process, as he had in Grutter, to make sure that what 
is supposed to be an open-minded evaluation of each applicant’s 
diversity contribution potential does not devolve into an exercise 
of racial group balancing to hit pre-determined critical mass 
targets.155 
On remand, the same Fifth Circuit panel, by a 2-1 margin, 
ruled against further evidence gathering and reaffirmed its 
earlier conclusion with slightly different interpretation of the 
same record.156  This time, Judge Higginbotham focused on the 
rigidity of the race-neutral percent plan, which relies on de facto 
racial segregation in Texas high schools to achieve diversity and 
excludes talented students who are ranked just outside the 
 
152 . Consider the explanation of counsel in Gratz regarding the 
interaction that takes place at the University of Michigan’s undergraduate 
college: 
[o]n campus, these 18-year olds [(freshmen)] interact with 
students very different from themselves in all sorts of ways, 
not just race, not just ethnicity, but in all sorts of ways.  
Students, I think as we know, learn a tremendous amount 
from each other.  Their education is much more than the 
classroom. It’s in the dorm, it’s in the dining halls, it’s in the 
coffee houses. It’s in the daytime. It’s in the nighttime. It’s all 
the time. 
 
 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) 
(No. 02-242). 
153. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013). 
154. Id. at 2421. 
155. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
156. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g 
denied, 771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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percent cut-off.157  The race-conscious track with holistic review, 
he concludes, is necessary for UT-Austin to “patch[] the holes” 
left by the mechanical percent plan to “achieve diversity that 
contributes to its mission.” 158   The fact that relatively few 
underrepresented minority students are admitted through the 
race-conscious track, in his view, indicates the selection 
standards are competitive, rigorous, and tailored to find the 
most qualified.159 
Judge Garza, in his dissent, faults UT-Austin for failing to 
explain how the means (the race-conscious track used to 
assemble a critical mass of underrepresented minority students) 
contributes to the ends (“obtaining the educational benefits of 
diversity.”) 160   UT-Austin does not define critical mass in a 
manner that permits meaningful judicial review, he points out, 
and the school does not assess whether the diversity within the 
large portion of the incoming class admitted through the percent 
plan satisfies critical mass before engaging in race-conscious 
review.161  Hence, there is no way for an outside adjudicator to 
determine whether the race-neutral track alone would be 
sufficient to produce the kind of educational benefits that the 
state finds compelling.162 
The relationship between “critical mass” and the 
“educational benefits” is circular, because Grutter allows for 
 
157. Id. at 650-54.  In Gratz, Justice Ginsberg also criticized the percent 
plans for relying “on continued racial segregation at the secondary school 
level[,]” creating perverse incentives for “parents to keep their children in low-
performing segregated schools” and discouraging students “from taking 
challenging classes that might lower their grade point averages.” Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see Julie B. 
Cullen et al., Jockeying for Position: Strategic High School Choice Under Texas’ 
Top Ten Percent Plan 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
16,663), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16663 (evidence of Texas 
students strategically “trading down” to enroll in less rigorous high schools to 
improve their chances of admission via the percent plan). 
158. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 657. 
159. Id. at 656 (arguing that “holistic review’s low production of numbers 
is its strength, not its weakness.”). 
160. Id. at 662. 
161. Id. at 669 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
162. Nor does the school explain how applicants are reviewed for their 
contribution to this critical mass.  Id.; see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying rehearing en banc) (Garza, J., 
dissenting). 
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“critical mass [to be] defined by reference to the educational 
benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”163  In essence, 
UT-Austin can use its output, the educational benefits, to justify 
its input, critical mass achieved through race-conscious means. 
Since the output cannot be measured or approximated, the input 
needed to produce a given level of output also cannot be 
specified.  Thus, the benefits generated by the class assembled 
through the race-neutral track alone and the additional benefits 
gained from diversity supplemented from the race-conscious 
track cannot be compared; the necessity of the latter is nearly 
impossible to prove.  Fisher will almost certainly return to the 
Supreme Court, where the Justices may remand again for more 
facts – perhaps forcing UT-Austin to disclose how it determines 
critical mass and the details of how applicants are assessed in 
its multi-factor holistic evaluation.  But even so, judges would 
still have trouble second-guessing the school’s assessment that 
the race-conscious track produces more benefits than the race-
neutral track alone.164 
Instead of further scrutiny of the school’s educational 
policies, the analysis could be simplified by looking not only at 
the benefits but also at the costs.  When the benefit of something 
is hard to assess, it is often easier to ask whether it’s worth the 
costs.  Grutter itself uses a cost-benefit analysis, albeit a crude 
one, to conclude that the educational benefits to diversity 
outweigh the burdens on applicants.  It would be more straight 
forward to require UT-Austin to show that the extra benefits 
created by the race-conscious track outweigh the burdens 
imposed on the would-be admits who are displaced along this 
track.  So long as this relative inequality holds true, courts need 
not be concerned about whether critical mass has been attained 
or whether the “full” benefits of diversity has been realized.  
Instead, the school must account for the cost, if any, of getting 
the critical mass it desires. 
 
 
 
163. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
164. As Justice Douglas noted in DeFunis v. Odegaard, “[c]ourts are not 
educators [and] their expertise [in educational policy] is limited.” 416 U.S. 312, 
344 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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C. Burdens 
 
The controversy over affirmative action in admissions exists 
not because of differing opinions about the educational benefits 
of diversity, but because racial preferences benefit some 
applicants at the expense of others.  From DeFunis to Fisher, 
virtually every lawsuit challenging affirmative action in higher 
education has been brought by a rejected applicant claiming to 
have been harmed.165  Never has a plaintiff been an admitted 
student who complained that the benefits of campus diversity 
were inadequate.166  While the burden of displacement drives 
lawsuits, courts have been preoccupied with the burden of 
unequal treatment, a legal construct that may have outlived its 
usefulness.167 
The denial of equal treatment on the basis of race, also 
known as the “inability to compete on an equal footing,” arises 
from the quota context “[w]hen the government erects a barrier 
that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain 
 
165. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Lesage v. 
Texas, 528 U.S. 18 (1999); DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 312; Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 
2004); Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 
2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996); Henson v. Univ. of 
Ark., 519 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1975). 
166. Other types of burdens attributed to affirmative action in higher 
education, which are not raised by plaintiffs and which do not contribute to the 
political backlash against affirmative action to the same extent as the 
displacement burden, are not addressed in Part III, though the paradigm shift 
proposed in the second half of this article works to ease at least two of these 
types of burdens.  The first is the burden of stigmatization that race-based 
preferences in admissions may have on minority students of favored groups, 
imbuing them with an inferiority complex in their own self-conception.  See, 
e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); 
SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN 
AMERICA (1990); see also infra Part V.A.  The second is the burden of mismatch 
on assisted minority admits, who are said to be admitted to schools that are 
too rigorous for their abilities and are more likely to underperform, fail or drop 
out.  See, e.g., RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP AND WHY 
UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012); Richard Sander, A Systemic Analysis of 
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004); see 
also infra Part VII.B. 
167. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1079-80 (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 999 
F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. Tex. 1998)). 
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a benefit than it is for members of another group.” 168   The 
“imposition of the barrier” is itself the burden, “not the ultimate 
inability to obtain the benefit.”169  So all applicants blocked by 
the barrier are burdened, regardless of whether they would have 
been admitted.170  In Bakke, Justice Powell tried to bridge the 
difference between the displacement and unequal treatment 
burdens, by assuming the position of an actually displaced 
applicant and examining his treatment under the Harvard 
Program: 
 
The applicant who loses out on the last available 
seat to another candidate receiving a “plus” on the 
basis of ethnic background will not have been 
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat 
simply because he was not the right color or had 
the wrong surname. It would mean only that his 
combined qualifications, which may have included 
similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh 
those of the other applicant. His qualifications 
would have been weighed fairly and 
competitively, and he would have no basis to 
complain of unequal treatment under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.171 
 
Justice Powell’s reasoning, that an applicant who got a fair 
review in the admissions review process cannot claim unequal 
treatment even if he were displaced by the race-plus factor, 
allows courts to prioritize the burden of unequal treatment 
 
168. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 665 (1993); see also Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21. 
169. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am, 508 U.S. at 
665. 
170. Allen Bakke could not prove that he would have been admitted to the 
U.C. Davis Medical School had it not been for the school’s affirmative action 
program, which set aside 16 of 100 places in the entering class for 
underrepresented minority students.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279.  Nor could the 
defendant medical school prove that Bakke still would have been rejected 
absent the set-aside program.  Id. at 320.  Hence, Bakke could not establish 
standing to sue based on a displacement burden theory, and the courts, in 
recognizing the unequal treatment burden, gave him another basis to assert 
standing for the lawsuit.  Id. 
171. Id. at 317. 
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above that of displacement.  If the racially-disparate treatment 
does not violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, 
then any displacement that occurs as a consequence of the 
unequal treatment could also be dismissed as a matter of law.172  
This ruling gives any applicant who complains of unequal 
treatment standing to sue regardless of whether he or she was 
actually displaced, but if the court finds the preferential 
treatment passes constitutional muster, any complaint about 
displacement can be ignored.173 
The Grutter majority followed this path.174  After deciding 
that the benefits of diversity were compelling to the government 
and noting that Michigan Law School’s admissions program 
provided for holistic review along the same lines of the Harvard 
Program, Justice O’Connor dispensed with concerns about 
burdens by citing Justice Powell.175  In the Court’s view, so long 
as the plaintiff got a fair shake in the admissions process, he or 
she would have no basis to complain.  Hence, the conclusion that 
Michigan Law School’s “race-conscious admissions program does 
not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”176 
Analyzing and disposing the burden question entirely 
through the lens of unequal treatment is problematic for at least 
three reasons.  First, by ignoring the displacement burden, the 
analysis does not address the grievances that motivate the 
plaintiffs and their sympathizers, and make it more difficult for 
them to accept the rationale of the case.  Second, the unequal 
treatment burden casts all applicants of non-favored racial 
groups as bearing the burden and fuels the false victim effect.177  
Third, the analysis no longer describes the reality of the racially-
disparate treatment in the race-plus context. 
 
172. Id. at 316-18, 321. 
173. Lesage v. Texas, 528 U.S. 18, 20 (1999) (permitting a plaintiff to seek 
injunctive relief against “an ongoing race-conscious program” without having 
to “affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race 
were not considered” because “[t]he relevant injury in such cases is the 
‘inability to compete on an equal footing.’”). 
174. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003) (“Petitioner 
clearly has standing to bring this lawsuit.”). 
175. Id. at 341. 
176. Id. 
177. See supra Part III.B.2 (description of how racial preferences affect 
admission probabilities versus outcomes). 
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Having outlawed quotas and automatic point awards, the 
Court has cut down the barrier to compete to such an extent that 
the barrier is virtually gone, except for the race-plus factor.178  A 
school treats applicants differently on the basis of their race only 
when it gives the race-plus boost to favor one applicant at the 
expense of another.  Consider the following scenario from the 
Harvard College Program cited by Justice Powell: 
 
The Admissions Committee, with only a few 
places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose 
between A, the child of a successful black 
physician in an academic community with 
promise of superior academic performance, and B, 
a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of 
semi-literate parents whose academic 
achievement was lower but who had 
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an 
apparently-abiding interest in black power. If a 
good number of black students much like A but 
few like B had already been admitted, the 
Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a 
white student with extraordinary artistic talent, 
were also seeking one of the remaining places, his 
unique quality might give him an edge over both 
A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are often 
individual qualities or experience not dependent 
upon race but sometimes associated with it.179 
 
If A had superior credentials to C, and A is admitted, then 
A is an unassisted minority admit whose race did not help his 
application.  If A’s credentials were inferior or comparable to C’s 
and A was given the race-plus boost over C, then A would be a 
race-plus admit and C, having been displaced by unequal 
treatment, a would-be admit.  If B were admitted over C, it is 
possible that the admissions officer used the race-plus factor, but 
 
178. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-241) (counsel for respondents stating that “the record tells us . . 
.  95 percent of all the admissions decisions that are made each year are not 
affected by the consideration of race.”). 
179. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978). 
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if the school’s admissions policy permits giving a preference to 
applicants whose parents were not well-educated, then that 
could be the plus factor that put B above A and C, not race.  If C 
were admitted over A and B, the race-plus factor was not used 
even if the race of all three applicants were considered. 
Since only those who receive the benefit of the race-plus 
boost are treated with a racial preference, only those displaced 
as a consequence can be said to have been burdened by the 
preference.  Aside from race-plus admits and would-be admits, 
the rest of the applicant pool is untouched by the race-plus factor 
and cannot be said to have been “treated” unequally on the basis 
of race.  When our understanding of the unequal treatment 
burden is updated to match the way the race-plus factor is used, 
the two burdens become virtually the same.  Addressing the 
burden of affirmative action in terms of displacement would 
answer the complaints more directly and dispel the false burden 
effect. 
Having clarified the burden and the burden-bearers, what 
then is weight of their burden?  According to the Justice Scalia, 
the burden is onerous.  “[N]onminority individuals who are 
deprived of a legal education . . . by reason of their skin color,” 
he says, bear the burden of Michigan Law School’s race-
conscious admissions program.180  According to Liu, the burden 
is light.  He posits that the would-be admits by virtue of having 
just missed the cut-off for admission are strong applicants who 
are almost always accepted by other selective schools, and are 
not deprived of schooling altogether. 181   The weight of the 
displacement burden is the difference between the value of the 
opportunity that the displaced applicant was deprived of and his 
next best alternative.  Liu concludes that the would-be admits 
are fairly content with the school that they attend, and are not 
the ones filing lawsuits. 
However, the personal circumstances of each would-be 
admit is unique.  Barbara Grutter’s alternative was Wayne 
State University Law School, a Tier III law school, which did not 
have the health law program she sought to study, so she never 
attended law school.  We do not know if Grutter was a would-be 
 
180. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
181. Liu, supra note 76, at 1093. 
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admit or a false-burden bearer. 182   Getting into a close 
equivalent alternative school does not preclude an applicant 
from feeling aggrieved.  Jian Li, who filed a complaint with the 
U.S. Department of Education against Princeton in 2006 for race 
bias in admissions, had been admitted to Yale and transferred 
to Harvard. 183   The question of how to deal with private 
valuations of the burden will be addressed in Part V, in 
conjunction with accommodation mechanisms. 
 
D. Demoralization Costs 
 
Like other social programs that reallocate opportunities to 
promote net social gains, affirmative action creates burdens for 
some individuals, and policymakers can leave the burdens 
where they initially fall or compensate the burden-bearers to 
ensure that no one is made worse off in the course of making 
society better off.184  To these two choices, Frank Michelman 
added a third: burden-bearers should be compensated only when 
it is more costly to ignore their burden.185  In his seminal study 
of uncompensated property takings, Michelman explained that 
when individuals believe that government action has deprived 
them of benefits to which they have legitimate claims and leave 
their losses unaddressed, they and their sympathizers may feel 
demoralized.186  He observed that demoralized property-holders 
will cut back on improvements to their property if they believe 
their property could be taken without compensation, and society 
 
182. Counsel for Bollinger contends that Grutter would not have been 
admitted under a race-neutral policy, but concedes that the issue was not 
litigated conclusively.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
183. See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, New Challenge to Affirmative Action, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED. (Nov. 14, 2006), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/14/princeton. 
184. See ROBERT ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 65 (3d 
ed. 2002) (comparing Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiency models); William A. 
Fischel & Perry Schapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on 
Economic Interpretations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 17 J. LEGAL. STUD. 269 
(1988). 
185. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1223 
(1967); see also ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 184, at 498. 
186. See Michelman, supra note 185, at 1215. 
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would suffer from under-development of property.  He called the 
hidden cost of uncompensated government takings 
demoralization costs.187 
Getting rejected by colleges can be a demoralizing 
experience.  As Judge Garza notes, “It is no exaggeration to say 
that the college application is 18 years in the making and is an 
unusually personal experience: the application presents a 
student’s best self in the hope that her sustained hard work and 
experience to date will be rewarded with admission.”188  The 
preparations create great expectations, which compound the 
rejected applicant’s sense of disappointment.189  Applicants to 
selective schools are unlikely to reduce their preparation even if 
they may be burdened by affirmative action.  Most students 
apply with very limited advanced information about their 
prospects.  The uncertainty of success and increasing 
competition (which compounds the uncertainty) induce them to 
over-apply, which leads to higher rates of rejections and greater 
demoralization and more false burden-bearers.190 
Compensation is not needed, according to Michelman, if a 
social program distributes the burdens and benefits evenly or 
over time such that the current burden-bearers may see a 
benefit to themselves from the program in the future.191  To the 
 
187. Id. at 1214. 
188. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 265 (5th Cir. 
2011) (Garza, J., concurring). 
189. Supporters of affirmative action sometimes point to preferences for 
children of alumni or athletes as other deviations from purely meritocratic 
admissions norms, but those considerations do not trigger heightened 
constitutional scrutiny and do not give rise to the same kind of political 
backlash.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (colloquy between Justice Scalia and counsel for 
respondents, agreeing that the Constitution does not preclude the disparate 
treatment of oboe and flute players or the giving of legacy preferences to 
children of alumni); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“The Equal Protection Clause does not, however, prohibit the use of unseemly 
legacy preferences or many other kinds of arbitrary admissions procedures.”). 
190. See, e.g., Daniel de Vise, For Georgetown Dean, Common Application 
is Part of a Larger Admissions Problem, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2010 9:24 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/28/ 
AR2010092804421.html. 
191. Michelman, supra note 185, at 1223 (giving Social Security and the 
progressive income tax as examples of programs that do not to need 
compensate those burdened). 
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extent diversity in higher education benefits the entire society, 
the displaced burden-bearers should also stand to benefit.  But 
since race and ethnicity are discrete qualities that individuals 
cannot readily change, the aggrieved are more likely to regard 
affirmative action as a continued risk to themselves and their 
loved ones.192  Their frustration and disappointment may lay 
dormant but can manifest powerfully through the political 
process, which is “underproviding” diversity in higher education. 
Under Michelman’s model, compensation should be made 
when it costs less to accommodate than to ignore.  Based on the 
analysis thus far, we know the educational benefits of diversity 
are substantial, and the cost of ignoring the burden-bearers 
(both actual and false) is getting to be prohibitive (i.e. legal bans 
on affirmative action in eight states).  The cost to accommodate 
includes the weight of the displacement burden itself, which 
compensation must offset, and transaction cost of reaching a 
settlement with the burden bearers.  The weight of the 
displacement burden is not known but is believed to be light 
though it may vary significantly across individuals.  The 
settlement process requires individuals to reveal their private 
valuations.  If a low-cost method of accommodation can be 
devised, then accommodation should be made.  Accommodation 
mechanisms are examined in Part V.  The next part explains 
how the paradigm shift proposed in this article fits into the 
existing legal and constitutional framework, and addresses 
moral concerns. 
 
 
 
192. See id. at nn.92, 95-96.  When Jennifer Gratz was asked why she 
continued to press her lawsuit after she had graduated from the University of 
Michigan, she pointed to the next generation: 
 
I think that the [affirmative action] policy is wrong. I mean, 
I’ve watched other kids apply, I coached different sports in 
high school, watched those kids apply to school, and one day 
I’ll probably have kids of my own, and I think that people 
should be treated fairly and equally and not treated 
differently based on the color of their skin. 
 
On Air Interview by Anderson Cooper with Jennifer Gratz, on CNN NewsNight 
with Aaron Brown (Dec. 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0212/02/asb.00.html. 
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V.     Paradigm Shift 
 
A. Property Rules, Liability Rules 
 
The legal battle over affirmative action has been waged for 
decades over competing entitlements to constitutional equal 
protection: the applicant-plaintiffs’ right to race-neutral 
admissions review versus the school-defendants’ right to 
consider race in admissions.193  In each case, the court awarded 
one side’s claim with what law and economic theorists call 
property rule protection.194  A property rule protects a right or 
entitlement with absolute legal protection. 195   Hopwood and 
Wooden gave the plaintiffs’ claim to race-neutral treatment this 
legal right of way and outlawed race-conscious admissions in the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.196  Grutter reversed and granted 
property rule protection to the schools’ entitlement to use the 
race-plus factor for 25 years.  Most laws are property rules.  They 
provide rigid, bright-line legal protection for recognized rights. 
Property rules are supposed to bring finality to disputes, but 
in cases where competing claims are closely-matched and 
pursued by highly-motivated parties, the all-or-nothing nature 
of property rule judgments can inflame the controversy.  The 
battle over affirmative action is so bitter that neither side is 
willing to concede.  The Gratz and Grutter plaintiffs, unwilling 
to live with the Grutter ruling, threw their support behind 
Proposal 2 and persuaded Michigan voters to write property rule 
protection for race-neutral admissions into the state 
constitution.197   Pro-affirmative action groups spent the next 
decade trying to overturn this enactment and restore the 
property rule of Grutter until the High Court halted their efforts 
in Schuette. 
 
193. See cases cited supra note 165. 
194. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 184, at 235-38; Guido Calabresi & 
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
195. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 
2178-79 (1997). 
196. Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996). 
197. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing how Gratz and 
Grutter launched the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative). 
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Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed introduced liability 
rules as the alternative to property rules to help the rule-maker 
who is unable or unwilling to declare one side the absolute 
winner over the other.198  A liability rule splits the decision of 
which side should receive the law’s backing into two parts—the 
legal entitlement and the option to transfer it to the other side 
for a price.  For example, a court may initially award the legal 
right of way to Party A, but subject this right to an option given 
to Party B.  Party B, by exercising the option and paying Party 
A a price, can obtain the law’s protection for its entitlement to 
which Party A must then yield.  Party B’s payment helps to 
cushion Party A’s loss.  By giving something to both sides, 
liability rules reduce the likelihood that the parties will continue 
their conflict. 
Liability rules give rule-makers greater flexibility in 
devising more balanced remedies.  Calabresi and Melamed 
introduced liability rules using call options, the option to 
purchase/acquire.  In the example above, Party B’s call option 
allows him to acquire the legal right of way from Party A.199  
Liability rules can also use put options, the option to 
sell/convey.200  Party A might receive both the legal right of way 
and the option to convey it to Party B for a price.  Party A decides 
whether to keep the right or to sell it.  Liability rules test how 
much the parties value their claims by giving them choices 
between the right and some sort of compensation, so the right 
that is valued more gets the legal protection. 
Altogether, the property and liability rules form a menu of 
six basic ways for the rule-maker to devise legal remedies for 
any dispute involving two parties.201  Not every rule is applicable 
 
198 . See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 194, at 1006-09; see also 
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 184, at 235-38. 
199. Party B’s call option imposes a corresponding obligation on Party A 
to sell or surrender the legal entitlement when the option is exercised. See 
Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854-
56 (1993). 
200. See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property Rights With Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 793, 797-800 (1998); see also Ian Ayres & Jack M. Balkin, Legal 
Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 
YALE L.J. 703 (1996). 
201 . See Ian Ayres and Paul Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and 
Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (2001) 
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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in every situation, but the menu can help the ruler-maker 
rearrange and evaluate competing claims in creative ways to 
arrive at the optimal outcome.  Table 2 lays out how the six basic 
rules would apply to a dispute between a school and a would-be 
admit.  The would-be admits are currently not known but they 
could be readily identified by the admissions offices, which 
maintain waiting lists and can most definitely use their 
individualized review of applications to determine which 
applicants would have been accepted. 202   Schools have been 
reluctant to identify the would-be admits out of fear of litigation, 
but may be willing to do so as part of an accommodation 
arrangement that would shield them from liability.203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(showing “that there are an infinite number of rules . . . that produce identical 
entitlement allocations, but which affect how the disputants divide the 
entitlement’s value.”). 
202 . Two of the accommodation mechanisms discussed below do not 
require schools to inform the would-be admits. See discussion infra Part VI. 
203 . Liability rules that clearly divide legal entitlements provide 
incentives for parties to reveal private information. See Ian Ayres & Eric 
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate 
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995). 
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Table 2: Settlement Outcomes under the Six Basic Rules204 
 
 
The property rules (Rules 1 & 3) are already familiar.  The 
ruling majorities in Bakke, Grutter and Fisher and Colorado 
voters in 2008 adopted Rule 1 to preserve affirmative action.  Its 
direct opposite, Rule 3, has been endorsed by judges in several 
lower court decisions, voters in the other state ballot initiatives, 
Governor Jeb Bush in Florida, and the New Hampshire 
 
204. The rules are numbered based on the convention set forth in Ayres 
& Goldbart, supra note 201, at 5-6. 
Rule No. Rule Type School’s rights, options 
and obligations 
Would-be admit’s 
rights, options and 
obligations 
Rule 1 Property Right to use the race-plus 
factor. 
Obligation to accept 
denial of admission.  
Rule 3 Property Obligation to accept the 
would-be admit. 
Right to be admitted with 
race-neutral review.  
Rule 2 Liability 
Call Option 
Obligation to accept the 
would-be admit and option to 
acquire her right (i.e. pay her 
to be denied).  If the school 
exercises the option, it may 
then use the race-plus factor. 
Right to be admitted 
subject to the school’s 
option, which if exercised, 
would obligate her to 
accept compensation for 
the denial of admission. 
Rule 4 Liability 
Call Option 
Right to use the race-plus 
factor subject to the would-be 
admit’s option, which if 
exercised, would obligate the 
school to accept her.  Her 
payment would compensate 
the school for loss of 
diversity. 
Obligation to accept 
denial of admission and 
option to acquire the 
school’s right (i.e. pay the 
school to accept her).  If 
she exercises the option, 
she would gain 
admission. 
Rule 5 Liability 
Put Option 
Obligation to accept the 
would-be admit unless she 
exercises her option, which 
would obligate the school to 
acquire her right (i.e. pay her 
to be denied) and allow the 
school to use the race-plus 
factor. 
Right to be admitted and 
option to convey this right 
to the school. If she 
exercises the option, she 
would accept 
compensation to forego 
admission. 
Rule 6 Liability 
Put Option 
Right to use the race-plus 
factor and the option to 
convey this right to the 
would-be admit (i.e. have her 
pay the school to accept her).  
If the school exercises the 
option, it would receive 
compensation from her for 
the loss of diversity. 
Obligation to accept 
denial of admission 
unless the school 
exercises its option, which 
would obligate her to 
acquire the school’s right 
and gain admission. 
56http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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legislature.  After Grutter sunsets in 2028, Rule 3 would become 
the law of the land. 
Three of the four liability rules have real world analogues. 
The forced-buyout concept of Rule 2 resembles the proposed 
admissions arrangement at issue in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada.205  In that pre-Brown v. Board case, the Supreme Court 
rejected Missouri’s attempt to satisfy the requirement of 
“separate but equal” by offering to pay black students to attend 
out-of-state law schools to preserve segregation at an in-state 
law school.  The difference here is that this Rule 2 seeks to 
promote racial diversity instead of racial segregation.206 
Rule 4 describes the widespread if not unwritten practice in 
higher education of wealthy patrons making large donations to 
selective schools to reserve seats therein for their relatives or 
designees.207  In these “buy-in” transactions, the school usually 
sets high prices to benefit from the patrons’ high valuation of a 
place in the admitted class.  The donations can benefit the entire 
campus, but admitting privileged applicants in this way also 
displaces other applicants.  Unlike affirmative action, disparate 
treatment on the basis of donations is not constitutionally 
suspect.  Rule 4 discriminates on the ability to pay.  Since schools 
with affirmative action programs tend to possess greater 
resources than the typical applicant, and since diversity is 
presumed to be generating benefits for the school, it seems 
unfair to ask the would-be burden-bearers to buy out the would-
be beneficiaries. 
 
205. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1938). 
206. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-241). Counsel for respondent stating: 
 
[T]here is certainly a major difference between an 
educational policy that is motivated by an intent to exclude 
people based on racial animus and one like the Law School’s 
policy and the Harvard Plan, which is designed to include 
students of all races, so that the education of all students will 
be enriched as a result.  
 
Id. 
207. See, e.g., Daniel Golden, How Much Does It Cost To Buy Admission?, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2003), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1047409881995483800. 
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Airlines routinely use a Rule 5 arrangement to resolve the 
problem of overbooked flights – by giving all passengers the 
right to stay on the overbooked flight and an option for a seat on 
a later flight plus a complementary ticket.  Passengers who do 
not mind departing later and want the free ticket will exercise 
the option.  No passenger is left aggrieved.  By giving the 
passenger both the initial right to fly and a put option, Rule 5 
ensures that the passengers cannot be under-compensated. 208  
Rule6 also has a put option but it is unnecessary to double-
protect the school.  Since a school that favor diversity will not 
exercise its option and will keep its right to use race-plus factor, 
Rule 6 turns into Rule 1. 
Out of the four rules above, Rules 2 and 5 hold the most 
intuitive appeal because they require the beneficiary to 
compensate the burden-bearer, even though the two rules would 
assign the initial right as well as the corresponding options to 
opposite sides.  In theory, when the cost of bargaining between 
parties is low, the parties will arrive at the same optimal 
outcome regardless of which rule is chosen.209  In this situation, 
the cost of bargaining between one school and numerous would-
be admits could be significant and our aim is to simplify the 
bargaining process to lower the settlement cost.  The price on 
the options can have a strong impact on the bargaining process, 
and will be addressed in Part VI. 
 
B. Constitutional Implications 
 
Affirmative rights in the Constitution are thought of as 
“inalienable” – so inviolable that they cannot be waived or 
alienated by the individual – and generally protected by 
property rules.210  A notable exception is the Fifth Amendment’s 
 
208. Ayres, Protecting Property Rights with Puts, supra note 200, at 805. 
209. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability 
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 722 (1996) (explaining 
the Coase Theorem). 
210. See Daniel A. Farber, Afterword: Property and Free Speech, 93 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1239, 1253 (1999); Thomas Merrill, The Constitution and the 
Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco 
Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 1152-53 (1999). Calabresi and Melamed 
describe certain entitlements to be inalienable not in terms of constitutional 
rules, but as the result of paternal or moral norms. Calabresi & Melamed, 
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/5
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Takings Clause, which requires just compensation for 
government takings of private property.211  The Takings Clause 
is a classic liability rule, which gives the government the option 
to take property but requires compensation for the property 
owner.  It compels the government to weigh the public benefit of 
the taking against the cost of compensation.  Calabresi says the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause can be 
thought of in the same way as the Takings Clause. 212   The 
transfer of resources and opportunities to members of 
disadvantaged groups from individuals of non-favored groups 
constitutes takings, he argues, for which compensation ought to 
be paid because affirmative action as a policy vehicle to promote 
substantive equality cannot be justified by intent alone. 213  
Without compensation, “we often don’t know whether the taking 
is worthwhile,” and “the less we charge those who benefit from 
it, the easier it is [for them] to say [‘]we want the [benefit’],” he 
cautions.214  Hence, affirmative action programs should pass a 
“burden internalization test” by compensating those burdened to 
ensure the benefits created are indeed worth the 
redistribution. 215   Calabresi’s concept of burden 
internalization is drawn from Justice Scalia, who presumes 
society is usually reluctant to pay for programs that benefit the 
many at the expense of the few.216 
 
supra note 194, at 1111-15. 
211. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
212. Guido Calabresi, Senior Judge U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture at the Georgetown University Law 
Center, Thoughts on Equality in the American Constitution (Mar. 23, 2004), 
available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-
theory-workshop/files/GCalabresi.pdf. 
213. Id. Cf. Justice Oliver W. Holmes’s reminder not to “forget[] that a 
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the Constitutional way of paying for 
the change.” Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
214.  Calabresi, Thoughts on Equality in the American Constitution, supra 
note 212, at 9. 
215. Calabresi asks, “Affirmative Action: who pays? Is giving a poor black 
a job in the South something that a poor white steel worker in the South pays? 
Or is it you and me?  Very different.  I think we have to give the poor black 
steel worker a job.  But it’s very easy to say that, if we are not the ones paying 
for it.” Id. at 11. 
216. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).  
Justice Scalia reasons that the Equal Protection Clause “requires the 
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Burden internalization goes to the heart of this article’s 
argument and is the breakthrough that can calm the controversy 
over affirmative action in higher education and preserve the 
benefits of diversity.  Contrary to Justice Scalia’s presumption, 
diversity’s benefits do in many if not most schools outweigh the 
costs to the would-be admits, which should make burden 
internalization attractive to supporters of affirmative action, 
because it would offer a much stronger proof of diversity’s merits 
and a stronger defense of race-conscious admissions, both in the 
courtroom and forum of public opinion. 
Constitutional law scholars are skeptical of efforts to 
replace property with liability rule protection for constitutional 
rights.217  But their criticism of this approach is betrayed by the 
reality that cost-benefit analysis has already crept into the heart 
of equal protection jurisprudence.  Even before Grutter, the 
Supreme Court was already taking the equal protection down 
this path by converting the strict scrutiny review standard from 
a most exacting constitutional inquiry into a cost-benefit 
analysis that balances interests of the state against purportedly 
inviolable rights of the individual.218  Indeed, the strict scrutiny 
test itself, with an interest prong and a tailoring prong, has cost-
benefit balancing embedded in its structure.  In each of Bakke, 
Gratz and Grutter, the Justices used the interest prong to assess 
the benefits created by state action, and then used the tailoring 
prong to reduce the perceived burden on individuals of members 
of non-favored groups.219 
 
democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones that which 
they impose on you and me.” Id. (Scalia J., concurring). Calabresi says “we 
must bear the burden, if we would [put the burden] on them.” Calabresi, 
Thoughts on Equality in the American Constitution, supra note 212, at 10 
(emphasis added). See also Michelman, supra note 185, at 1169. 
217 . See e.g., AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES nn. 112 &115 (1997) (contending that states are 
permitted to “treat violations of sacred constitutional rights as merely the cost 
of doing business.”). 
218. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997). 
219. In Grutter, counsel for respondents urged the Court to weigh the 
burdens against the benefits. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (“[The burden of affirmative action] 
is certainly something that the Court has to pay attention to, but this is 
extremely limited in scope and relative to the benefits to students of all races 
and to our Nation. It has to be weighed in the balance.”). See also Liu, supra 
note 76, at 1061. 
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The standard handed down from the affirmative action 
cases, however, is difficult for lower courts to apply because the 
precedents do not demand from the litigants (especially the 
schools) the kind of evidence that would enable a judge to enter 
into cost-benefit formula and arrive at a clear answer.  Instead, 
judges must compare qualitative descriptions of an educational 
benefit versus complaints about the necessity of racially-
disparate treatment.  Reasonable judges look at the same 
information and come down on different sides.220  The Supreme 
Court’s instruction in Fisher to be less deferential to the schools 
has not yielded a clearer ruling on remand.221 
The cost-benefit analysis utilized in the strict scrutiny test 
could be fine-tuned by adding a requirement that such schools 
internalize the burden.  Schools that use the race-plus factor 
should account for and accommodate those displaced by their 
race-based admissions preferences.  Such a requirement would 
induce the parties to disclose more information, which would 
help to demonstrate more precisely the actual cost-benefit 
balance of the program. 
 
C. Market-Inalienability: Moral Concern and Justification 
 
In proposing to have the beneficiaries accommodate the 
burden-bearers, this article makes Grutter’s cost-benefit 
analysis explicit and may invite objections on moral grounds. 
Put plainly, some may feel that seats in universities should not 
be bought and sold.  The prospect of compensating displaced 
applicants and potentially monetizing their burden may strike 
some as unseemly even if the objective is to save affirmative 
action from misguided political backlash.  Objections on moral 
and humanistic grounds can be evaluated and addressed using 
Margaret Radin’s framework of market-inalienability.222  The 
 
220. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (9-7 vote 
denying petition for rehearing en banc); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (en banc panel divided 5-4); Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 
1996) (per curiam) (8-7 vote denying petition for rehearing en banc); cf. Coal. 
to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc panel divided 8-7). 
221. See supra Part IV.B. discussion of Fisher. 
222. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 
(1987). 
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framework is useful not only to critique the proposal but also 
demonstrates the value of the diversity rationale and provides a 
moral justification for the proposal. 
In its simple form, the market-inalienability framework 
holds that some things can be given but not sold,223 because the 
buying and selling of things or even the discussion of things in 
terms of their buying and selling have a tendency to commodify 
the thing being transacted or discussed in terms of 
transactions.224  When things are commodified, they are made 
fungible, and when a thing that is near and dear to human 
personhood, such as human organs or babies, is rendered 
fungible, the result is “an inferior conception of human 
flourishing.”225  To avoid this diminished sense of humanity, it is 
necessary to prohibit the sale of certain things, which could 
otherwise be transferred through gifts, such as the adoption of 
children and donation of organs.  Hence, “market-inalienability” 
emphasizes the idea that certain things cannot be alienated 
through transactions in the marketplace even though they may 
be alienated as gifts on non-economic terms.226 
The type of accommodation proposed in this article is purely 
compensatory.  To the extent the accommodation is monetized 
(it need not be) and takes the form of a school’s “purchase” and 
the would-be admit’s “sale” of her entitlement to race-neutral 
admissions review, the transaction is confined to the two 
parties.227  Such a bilateral compensatory transaction cannot 
spread to other parties.  No “market” could form nor could any 
of the other outward trappings of commodification such as 
“supply and demand pricing, brokerage and arbitrage, 
advertising and marketing, stockpiling, speculation, and 
valuation in terms of the opportunity cost of production” 
materialize.228  The would-be admit can only be compensated by 
 
223. Id. at 1850. 
224. Id. at 1836, 1871-72. 
225. Id. at 1885-86. 
226. Id. at 1850, 1853. 
227 . Radin considers “[s]ales caused by official monetization of 
nonmonetary interests” including “compensation in tort” to be a “narrow” form 
of commodification, but does not object to monetization of tort harms. Id. at 
1859 n.43.  Compensatory transactions are inherently limited in scope, deeply 
grounded in the law and cannot be readily commodified. 
228. Id. at 1855. 
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the school that burdened her, and she cannot sell or assign her 
entitlement to anyone else.  The school remains in firm control 
of which students may have access to the admitted class because 
the school determines who receives the race-plus factor and who 
is burdened. 
Radin is also concerned by the use of market rhetoric to 
describe social interactions that do not involve buying and 
selling as if they were transactions, because market rhetoric, in 
turn, can cause people to use market methodologies, such as 
monetary cost-benefit analysis, to evaluate those social 
interactions. 229   Once the social interactions are understood 
through market vernacular, there is a tendency to reach for 
market mechanisms to regulate the interactions. 230   Since 
market mechanisms often ignore human interests that are not 
“readily monetizable[,]” those interests can be unintentionally 
diminished when liability rules take hold.231  This article uses 
the rhetoric of “benefits” and “burdens” to describe impact of 
affirmative action in higher education, but does so to clarify the 
cost-benefit analysis that the Supreme Court is already applying 
to the subject matter.  Whereas Radin’s framework is oriented 
against theories of universal commodification that call for 
“unrestricted choice for individuals to maximize individual 
gains from trade,” the accommodation proposal in this article is 
intended to maximize collective benefits to society or at least to 
preserve society’s choice to pursue a course toward greater 
progress, equality and, as we shall see, human flourishing.232 
On a deeper level, Radin’s promotion of human flourishing, 
which is based on her conception of personhood, directly 
supports the diversity rationale and provides a more 
fundamental justification for the proposal to accommodate.  
Radin describes personhood as consisting of three overlapping 
aspects – (1) freedom, (2) identity and (3) contextuality – and 
human flourishing requires satisfactory contributions to 
personhood in each of these three aspects.233 
 
229. Id. at 1859. 
230. Id. at 1836, 1878. 
231. Id. at 1878. 
232. Id. at 1860-61. 
233. Id. at 1804, 1861. 
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Identity “focuses on the integrity and continuity of the self 
required for individuation.” 234   Rather than a static concept, 
identity is a process cultivated through “personal individuation” 
and “self-development.”235   Individuation, or the formation of 
self-identity, occurs not in a vacuum but through interactions 
with one’s surroundings or contextuality, which “focuses on 
the necessity of self-constitution in relation to the environment 
of things and other people.” 236  In other words, “to be 
differentiated human persons, unique individuals, we must have 
relationships with the social and natural world.”237  Freedom, 
as “the will, or the power to choose for oneself”238 is the ability of 
the individual to “self-develop in accordance to one’s will in 
relation to one’s environment and other people.”239  This term 
should not be understood in the narrow sense of individuals 
choosing their identities, but having the kind of nurturing 
environment in which they have the ability to “will certain 
interactions [that are] integral to self-development.”240  Radin 
describes freedom as “a positive commitment to act so as to 
create and maintain particular contexts of environment and 
community.”241  The guarantee of freedom, as it is understood 
this way, is not so much a refrain from interfering with 
individual will, as it is an affirmative duty to create that 
environment which is conducive to self-development.242 
Radin’s model of personhood in which individual identity is 
cultivated in a conducive environment echoes the diversity 
 
234. Id. at 1904 (“In order to have a unique individual identity, we must 
have selves that are integrated and continuous over time.”). 
235. Id. at 1905 (“Contextuality means that physical and social contexts 
are integral to personal individuation, to self-development.”). 
236. Id. at 1904, 1906.  (“One’s surroundings – both people and things – 
can become part of who one is, of the self.”). 
237. Id. at 1904. 
238. Id. (“In order to be autonomous individuals, we must at least be able 
to act for ourselves through free will in relation to the environment of things 
and other people.”). 
239. Id. at 1905. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. (Hence, “a positive view of freedom, in which the self-development 
of the individual is linked to pursuit of proper social development, and in which 
proper self-development, as a requirement of personhood, could in principle 
sometimes take precedence over one’s momentary desires or preferences.”). 
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rationale, which calls for a campus environment that is dynamic, 
varied and free, that is stimulating and yet respectful of the 
formation of each student’s identity.  In a less-varied 
environment, individuals may not appreciate the other 
possibilities against which they can reflect their self-awareness 
and enhance their self-understanding and thus be limited in 
their self-development.  In a more conforming environment, they 
may not be able to explore or choose a particular self-identity.  
The affirmative commitment to creating and maintaining an 
environment conducive to self-development that Radin calls for, 
is the same commitment that the Supreme Court made in 
Grutter to preserve diversity in higher education. 
In creating that diverse learning environment, schools bring 
together students not only of different race and ethnicities but 
also from varied geographic, social and economic backgrounds, 
having different talents, interests and conceptions of the world, 
and place them in one setting where intense self-development 
occurs.  In this setting, students may learn (or are more likely to 
realize) that despite their differences in appearance, background 
and prior beliefs, that they share much more than their 
differences would suggest, that they are united by a common 
curiosity to learn, by the ways in which they have learned to 
understand and engage in each other’s differences, by their 
common enthusiasm for the life ahead, and simply by their 
experience of living and learning together.  From this setting, 
they carry these shared experiences with them for the rest of 
their lives to all the places they venture and draw on them to 
engage in the people they meet and the ideas they encounter, 
and perhaps, use those experiences to shape the new settings 
over which they may exert influence.243 
In many respects, the diverse setting created on campus 
reflects an idealized view of America and the world.  It is a 
setting that is not readily found in the environments in which 
most of the students are raised.  This is what makes diversity in 
higher education so special and so appealing to those who have 
experienced it.  It represents an ideal concept of what the 
country and the world could and should be.  It is rooted in the 
 
243. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (regarding 
the importance of diversity in the training of leaders). 
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self-conception of the U.S. national identity, whether e pluribus 
unum or the quest for “a more perfect Union.”244   Having a 
united but diverse society depends on people whose self-
identities are comfortable with the diversity of their country and 
world. 
Now having understood Radin’s conception of personhood 
and its support for the diversity rationale, consider the impact 
of affirmative action on personhood.  Grutter’s requirement for 
individualized review of applications pays due respect to the 
uniqueness of individual applicants, but its acceptance of critical 
mass transforms the same individual applicants into seemingly 
fungible equivalents along racial and ethnic lines.  When a 
school publishes statistics of the racial and ethnic composition of 
the admitted class, all members in that class are instantly de-
individualized and sorted along group lines.  A common defense 
of critical mass, that more than a few underrepresented minority 
students are need to be present on campus to avoid any one from 
being regarded as a “token minority” whose beliefs and behavior 
might be erroneously stereotyped to represent his or her entire 
racial or ethnic group, is itself couched in terms of avoiding 
fungibility.245  But the notion that applicants should be made 
fungible on the basis of their race so that some of the admitted 
students could be perceived as not fungible seems to be an 
unsatisfactory promotion of personhood.  Race and ethnicity, 
which are determined by an individual’s internal genetic and 
cultural make-up on the one hand, and society’s external 
constructs of race and ethnicity on the other, cannot be readily 
altered by the individual.  Society’s external constructs are in 
turn influenced by the “rhetoric of race-conscious admissions,” 
which has an adverse impact on personhood. 
Consider Natasha Scott, a typical senior at a magnet high 
school in suburban Maryland applying to college in the fall of 
2010. 246   Her mother is Asian, her father is black, and she 
 
244. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
245. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320 (“Racial stereotypes lose their force because 
nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a 
variety of viewpoints among minority students.”). 
246. Susan Saulny & Jacques Steinberg, On College Forms, A Question of 
Race, or Races, can Perplex, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14admissions.html?_r=0. 
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identified herself as of both races in high school.  But when she 
applied to college, she wondered how to answer the question 
about race on the applications and sought advice anonymously 
from an online bulletin board for applicants, parents and 
advisors: 
I just realized that my race is something I have to 
think about, . . . It pains me to say this, but 
putting down black might help my admissions 
chances and putting down Asian might hurt it.247 
Every web commenter advised her to put down only African-
American as did her mother.  She followed their advice and was 
admitted to a prestigious school, but admits feeling guilty about 
“denying a part of [her]self to look like a more appealing college 
candidate.”248   Scott was forced to internalize the rhetoric of 
race-conscious admissions and deny part of her identity on her 
application.  In so doing, she had to break the integrity and 
continuity of her self-identity, which diminished the identity 
aspect of her personhood.  Scott’s dilemma is felt by many 
applicants, but whereas Scott seemingly had a choice, most do 
not. 249   This dilemma weighs on the applicants’ sense 
personhood and leads to an inferior sense of human flourishing. 
Note too, the impact that those surrounding Scott had on 
her decision – the perception of her mother and the commenters 
that putting down a non-favored race would hurt her chances.  
This is an example of a less tolerant contextuality working 
against the will of individuals to choose the course of their self-
development.  In the case of Scott, the alteration to her self-
identity was perhaps temporary.  Once in the tolerant 
contextuality of college, she could identify herself inwardly and 
 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Some Asian-American applicants leave blank the race box or check 
“white” to avoid what they believe to be higher hurdles facing Asian-American 
applicants at selective schools.  Jesse Washington, Some Asians’ College 
Strategy: Don’t Check ‘Asian’, A.P. (Dec. 3, 2011), 
http://news.yahoo.com/asians-college-strategy-dont-check-asian-
174442977.html. See also Scott Jaschik, Is It Bias? Is It Legal? INSIDE HIGHER 
ED. (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/02/03/federal-
probe-raises-new-questions-discrimination-against-asian-american-
applicants. 
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outwardly as mixed race again.  Even as affirmative action is 
helping to foster an ideal setting for learning on-campus, the 
rhetoric of race-conscious admissions is creating a more racially-
charged and less tolerant contextuality just outside the gates.  
To gain admission to the more ideal setting inside the ivory 
tower, where personhood could develop in freedom, must 
applicants make uncomfortable compromises with their identity 
while they are still on the outside looking in?  With the political 
backlash against affirmative action eroding the very 
commitment to create the diverse learning environment (Radin’s 
freedom), we can conclude that the Grutter regime is 
undermining all three aspects of personhood. 
Thus, we are confronted by the trade-off between the 
promotion of personhood within the diverse learning 
environment and the impingements on personhood by the 
rhetoric of race-conscious admissions.  Radin’s framework is 
flexible enough to recognize that in a “nonideal” world, certain 
forms of “partial commodification” may be justified if they can 
facilitate, not hinder, the eventual realization of a more “ideal 
world.” 250   The quest to reach the “ideal world,” which she 
describes as the “transition dilemma for social progress” coheres 
with the Grutter majority’s desire to move toward race-
neutrality over the sunset period.251  The proposal in this article 
to modify the Grutter regime with the accommodation 
requirement uses partial commodification to preserve diversity 
in the present and facilitate the transition toward race-
neutrality in the not-too-distant future. 252   Gifts, which 
 
250. See Radin, supra note 222, at 1903, 1924. 
251. Id. at 1915 & n.238.  Radin could be speaking for the Court in Grutter 
when she says: “We cannot make progress toward the noncommodification that 
might exist under ideal conditions of equality and freedom by trying to 
maintain noncommodification now under historically determined conditions of 
inequality . . . .”  Id. at 1906. 
252. Radin’s only caveat against using partial commodification to ease the 
transition is the risk that commodification rhetoric in the interim will make 
the realization of the ideal eventuality less likely.  Id. at 1915.  The proposal 
here may involve limited compensatory transactions that are not susceptible 
to marketization.  Any harm to the personhood of applicants from liability rules 
(i.e., partial commodification) is outweighed by the harm caused by the current 
race-conscious admissions regime.  Id. 
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strengthen social relationships and reinforce personhood, can 
also be used in accommodation.253 
 
VI.     Accommodation Mechanisms 
 
We now know that it is preferable to settle with the real 
burden-bearers of affirmative action when the cost of not settling 
is higher.  We have also identified at least two promising 
accommodation mechanisms (Rules 2 & 5) from the menu of 
standard remedies that could redress the would-be admits and 
ease the political backlash.  What are missing is the price, if any, 
and the logistics of arranging the settlement. 
According to Liu’s negligible burden hypothesis, the would-
be admits are not appreciably burdened by their displacement 
because they have nearly as good if not better alternative schools 
to attend. 254  If that were true, a token sum may satisfy their 
burden.  In Hopwood, the district court ordered UT-Austin and 
its law school to pay a dollar to each of the plaintiffs.255  Nominal 
compensation could also come in the form of a gift card from the 
campus store or honorary affiliation with the school.  Or it could 
be admissions-related such as guaranteed acceptance if the 
would-be admit were to re-apply as a transfer student or even a 
plus-factor preference on any applications to graduate schools at 
the same institution. 
If there is concern that a low price on the school’s call option 
(Rule 2) might undercompensate the would-be admit, the rule-
maker can vest the put option with her (Rule 5) so she can reject 
the settlement offer and force the school to admit her.  With Rule 
5, she can never be undercompensated.  If many would-be 
admits did so, the school might have too many matriculating 
students, a problem they regularly resolve by offering deferrals 
to the incoming class.  Regardless of what the would-be admits 
decide, the school can certify that no one is burdened by its use 
of race.  An option price that is set too high may give a windfall 
to the would-be admits and force schools to expend greater 
 
253. Id. at 1908. 
254. See Liu, supra note 76, at 1093. 
255. Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 923-24 (W.D. Tex. 1998), rev’d 
on other grounds, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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resources than necessary to achieve diversity.  The rule-maker 
can withdrawal from price setting altogether, and allow the 
school to determine the price on the would-be admit’s option.  
Each school can develop its own package of incentives to 
persuade the would-be admits to go elsewhere.256 
Schools could also look for other students in the admitted 
class who are willing to give up their seat for the race-plus 
admits for a lower price.  Suppose a school accepted 124 race-
plus admits and must internalize the burden of displacement.  
Instead of reaching out to the would-be admits, the school could 
invite members of the admitted class to take on that burden and 
attend another school in exchange for compensation.  Since 
many admitted students may prefer other schools that also 
accepted them, they may value a seat at this school less than the 
would-be admits, and would gladly accept a lower buy-out offer.  
Once a sufficient number of respondents had accepted the offer 
and agreed to be displaced, the school could then certify that it 
has internalized the burden of its race-based admissions 
preferences.257  The number of students who must accept this 
offer for the school to internalize the burden should be equal to 
the number of would-be admits, which as we have seen is the 
number of applicants that the school expects that it would have 
to admit to fill the seats that otherwise went to the race-plus 
admits. 
The accommodation mechanism could also operate with 
gifts, as per Radin’s model, instead of cash, goods or 
opportunities of value.  A school could appeal to its applicants to 
consider the greater good of diversity in higher education and 
ask them to taken on the burden of displacement without any 
material inducement.  This offer could be made, as in the 
example above, to students in the admitted class who are still 
deciding between schools.  It could also be made at an earlier 
stage in the admission process. 
 
256. A school could bargain with each would-be admit individually and 
reach different settlement amounts.  Such an approach would be very narrowly 
tailored; but for the ease of administration, it would be more practicable for the 
school to set one price for all of its would-be admits. 
257. Unassisted minority admits are just as eligible to accept the buy-out 
offer but race-plus admits are not. 
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A school could ask for volunteers among its applicants to 
step forward and allow themselves to be rejected so that 
underrepresented minority applicants could be admitted with 
the race-plus factor in their place.  In every admission cycle, 
some applicants will withdrawal their applications from one or 
more schools for various reasons.  Many do so because they have 
already received more attractive offers or scholarships from 
other institutions.  This voluntary burden acceptance approach 
targets these applicants by asking them to consider waiving 
their right to race-neutral treatment and consenting to be used 
to burdened with rejection. 258   If an applicant agrees to be 
designated a “voluntary burden-bearer,” the school must then 
determine if this volunteer would have been admitted.  If the 
volunteer was going to be admitted, then the school can fill the 
vacated seat in the admitted class with a race-plus admit. 
To give to a cause, a donor must believe in the cause.  This 
altruistic form of burden-internalization tests the willingness of 
applicants, who may attend other schools with diverse 
campuses, to make a symbolic gesture in support of diversity in 
higher education.  Having voluntary burden-bearers step 
forward and cover the cost of affirmative action would be a 
powerful demonstration of the beneficiaries’ commitment to 
diversity. 
Each of the mechanisms described above would incur fairly 
low settlement costs (at least lower than demoralization costs to 
justify settlement under Michelman’s model).  They also satisfy 
Calabresi’s call for burden internalization.  Other mechanisms 
can be devised along the same lines so long as they meet the 
foregoing conditions. 259   A school operating a race-conscious 
admissions program should make annual certifications that it 
has offset any displacement effect of its race-conscious 
admissions decisions by accommodating those who would have 
been displaced or finding qualified burden bearers to take on 
 
258. These applicants, by virtue of the more attractive alternatives they 
have, are likely to be admitted if they do not inform the school of their change 
of intention. 
259. There would be no retroactive application of the accommodation 
requirement as schools currently operating race-conscious admissions 
programs are doing so legally. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
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those burdens.  Along with this certification, the school should 
also report its race-plus usage during each application cycle. 
Disclosure of this statistic helps to inform the public of the true 
scale of affirmative action’s impact, as well as the schools’ 
dependence on the race-plus factor.  Over time, such statistics 
can help track progress toward the narrowing of the 
achievement gap. 
Greater disclosure of information about how racial 
preferences are used in admissions process may heighten for a 
time, race consciousness on campus, but revealing accurate 
information about race-based preferences will help disprove the 
false burden effect.  Some may worry about the impact that the 
proposal may have on minority students themselves.  The 
distinction between unassisted minority admits and race-plus 
admits emphasized here might make minority students more 
self-conscious.  Schools can protect their race-plus admits by not 
informing them or anyone else of their status. 
 
VII.     Effect of Burden Internalization 
 
If the benefits of diversity significantly outweigh the 
burdens of affirmative action, as this author believes, the change 
in the type of legal protection for affirmative action (from 
property to liability rules) will have a limited effect on the 
student composition of most campuses.  Most selective schools 
would still admit the best minority applicants they can and 
make the accommodation necessary to permit their continued 
use of the race-plus factor as they need.  The actual pay-out, if 
any, would not be onerous.  Nevertheless, the accommodation 
and information disclosure requirements would alter the 
incentive structure sustaining diversity in higher education and 
produce welcomed effects on how diversity programs are 
managed, how minority students are motivated, and how 
affirmative action is perceived. 
 
A. Impact on Schools 
 
The specific impact of burden internalization will vary with 
each school’s reliance on race-conscious measures to achieve 
diversity.  Schools that do not consider race in admissions, 
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including those that use only race-neutral means to attain 
diversity, will be unaffected.  Selective schools that can assemble 
critical masses of minority students entirely through unassisted 
minority admits can certify that while they consider race in 
admissions, they do not need to accommodate because they are 
not giving race-based preferences.  Such schools will be the 
model under the new regime.  Their reputation for not having to 
use race as a plus-factor will attract more high achieving 
minority students who do not want to be stigmatized by the 
suspicion that they had benefited from racial preferences.  These 
top minority students can in turn help the schools maintain 
diversity costlessly.  A virtuous cycle thus develops. 
Other selective schools that depend on the race-plus factor 
would have to determine whether the resources they devote to 
race-conscious admissions are worth the benefits.  In so doing, 
they must evaluate how well their diversity programs are 
working and compare the benefits they currently derive with 
that which they might obtain from race-neutral means to 
achieve campus diversity.  Some schools may make the switch to 
race-neutrality if they believe any decline in educational benefits 
to be slight relative to the cost savings.  Other schools might find 
it worthwhile to increase their use of the race-plus factor because 
the benefits they derive far outweigh the accommodation costs.  
Many schools will emulate the model schools by attracting and 
accepting more unassisted minority admits.260 
As race-plus admits become more costly to enroll, selective 
schools will find it worthwhile to help convert these students 
into unassisted minority admits.  After all, colleges and 
universities are better at teaching than compensating, and they 
have considerable unused capacity to help incubate minority 
youths into competitive applicants. 261   Resources used to 
accommodate could instead be spent on helping these students.  
 
260. Applicants from non-favored racial groups who can contribute to 
racial or ethnic diversity on campus will also be in greater demand.  See 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 338 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 
438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
261. Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the 
Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 224 (2003) (criticizing 
American higher education for failing to take a more direct and active role in 
efforts to narrow the achievement gap in secondary education). 
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Admissions counseling, summer classes, and preparatory 
courses can all improve an applicants’ credentials.262  Many post-
secondary schools already offer special college preparatory 
programs but only for paying students. 263   Under the new 
regime, schools would have a much greater incentive to work 
directly toward narrowing the achievement gap.264 
 
B. Impact on Underrepresented Minority Students 
 
The premium that schools will place on unassisted minority 
applicants will in turn alter the achievement incentives for 
minority students, particularly those who are just below the 
race-neutral cutoff.  Currently, this latter group can reliably 
gain admission, but as schools work to reduce accommodation 
costs, having slightly higher grades and test scores would 
suddenly become much more consequential.  A better grade in 
Algebra II or a few points higher on the SATs may mean 
scholarships and offers from better schools or avoiding 
mandatory remedial programs that some schools might require 
race-plus admits to attend.  Thus, modifying the Grutter regime 
by adding the accommodation requirement might provide just 
the type of motivation for minority students to make 
incremental efforts to improve their academic credentials that 
Justice Thomas wants, but without the harsh effect of 
immediately throwing them into “the cauldron of 
competition.”265  The paradigm shift would allow for a milder 
 
262. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE 
VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION 
8-10 (2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/guidancepost.pdf (permitting 
schools to institute pipeline, outreach and mentoring programs to increase 
minority achievement at the high school and college level). 
263. After the passage of Proposition 209, the University of California’s 
system devoted more resources to cultivate minority students in secondary and 
primary education to expand the pool of competitive minority applicants.  
James Traub, The Class of Prop. 209, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/02/magazine/the-class-of-prop-
209.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
264. Cf. Scott Jaschik, Baylor Pays for SAT Gains, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 
15, 2008), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/10/15/baylor (school 
gives incentives to admittees to score higher on SATs). 
265. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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transition toward race-neutrality than what the Grutter 
dissenters demand, but would work steadily to erode affirmative 
action’s implicit race-norming effects.  Better preparation will 
help these minority students excel once they enroll, and reduce 
the concern that they will be “mismatched” with their school.266 
 
C. Enlisting The Support of Diversity’s Beneficiaries 
 
Accommodation costs will vary with each school, its 
applicant profile and the type of accommodation mechanism 
adopted but even the least costly form of accommodation plus 
efforts to boost minority achievement will require schools to 
expend additional resources and manpower under the proposed 
regime.  To cover these costs, schools can draw on the manifold 
beneficiaries of diversity, whose willingness to contribute can be 
powerful demonstration of how much they value this good. 
Aside from dipping into their own budgets and endowments, 
schools can seek government funding, which would more broadly 
socialize the cost of diversity.  Since the educational benefits are 
compelling to the government, it may be appropriate for society 
to pay for this public good.  In this era of public budget deficits, 
spending cuts, and declining public appetite for affirmative 
action, however, public finding may be difficult to secure.  
Current and prospective students who have or are about to 
partake in the diverse learning environment created for their 
benefit are another source for support.  Raising tuition would 
test their willingness (and that of their parents) to pay for 
diversity.  Following the passage of Proposition 2009, students 
at UC Berkeley approved the assessment of a student fee to fund 
minority outreach.267  Prospective and even current students, 
however, have not experienced the full extent of diversity’s 
benefits and may underappreciate its value.  A fee hike also tests 
the ability to pay more than willingness to pay.  With tuition 
growing faster than inflation, further fee increases will make 
higher education even less affordable. 
 
266. For the mismatch effect, see SANDER & TAYLOR, supra note 166. 
  267. See Constitution, BRIDGES MULTICULTURAL RES. CTR., 
https://callink.berkeley.edu/organization/bridgesmulticulturalresourcecenter/
DocumentLibrary/View/57432 (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). 
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Schools can appeal to their alumni for donations of their 
time and money to sustain on-campus racial diversity.  The 
broader societal benefits of diversity are spread through the 
graduates, and the rate of alumni donation is frequently used to 
measure student satisfaction.268  Asking these beneficiaries to 
contribute to a diversity preservation fund would reveal how 
much graduates value their learning experience.  Further afield, 
Corporate America has been among the most enthusiastic amici 
supporters of affirmative action.269  Big businesses believe that 
having a workforce trained in a diverse environment is vital to 
their success in the global marketplace.270  And where would 
elite law firms recruit the top-flight minority lawyers if the end 
to affirmative action constricted the pipeline?  These wealthier 
beneficiaries of diversity should be tapped for support. 
 
D. Informing the Public 
 
If schools can accommodate those who are displaced by race-
based admissions preferences (or finding volunteers to take on 
the burdens) and demonstrate the favorable cost-benefit balance 
of diversity, then affirmative action would become far less 
controversial.  Rejected applicants who do not receive 
accommodation offers will realize that they would have fared no 
better under a race-neutral admissions scheme.  Reaching this 
kind of understanding is particularly important as the false 
victim effect is likely to multiply as admissions rates fall at 
selective schools. 
With race-plus usage reported annually, the public will be 
able to track higher education’s progress toward the narrowing 
the achievement gap and compare the track record of different 
schools.  The accommodation requirement is designed to obviate 
itself when schools can enroll critical masses of minority 
students without using race-based preferences.  When this 
eventuality is realized, the aspirations of formal equality will 
 
268. See LEMANN, supra note 65. 
269 . See Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241); Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). 
270. See Brief of General Motors Corp., supra note 269, at 5. 
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converge with the reality of substantive equality, and thereby 
fulfilling the goal of colorblind equal protection while sustaining 
racial diversity.  Individual schools may reach this juncture at 
different points in time.  The new regime does not require the 
rule-maker to impose an arbitrary sunset date like Grutter’s 300 
month countdown.  It is possible that the achievement gap would 
not narrow for a considerable period of time, perhaps even 
beyond 2028.  There may be other racial or ethnic groups that 
schools may deem necessary to the on-campus diversity that 
may need preferences from time to time.  Liability rule 
protection for affirmative action, with its ability to internalize 
the burden and ease majority resentment can better sustain 
diversity over the longer term. 
When the public realizes how preciously few actually 
receive the race-plus boost, then more attention could be paid to 
the vast majority of disadvantaged underrepresented minority 
students whose needs have never been addressed by affirmative 
action.271  The resources, energy and time spent on protracted 
litigation and public ballot initiatives over race in admissions 
could be better used to address the underlying causes of the 
achievement gap.272 
 
VIII.     Conclusion 
 
For too long the two sides of the affirmative action dispute 
have traded claims about the burdens of racial preferences 
versus the benefits of diversity.  They have managed to convince 
rule-makers in different forums to enact opposing laws, but have 
 
271. See, e.g., SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC., GIVEN HALF A CHANCE: THE 
SCHOTT 50 STATE REPORT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION AND BLACK MALES 2 (2008) 
(noting that fewer than half of black male high school students in the United 
States graduated with their peers in the 2005-2006 school year). 
272. Fisher has appealed her case a second time to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Samantha Ketterer, Fisher Requests Supreme Court Hear Case Against 
UT a Second Time, DAILY TEXAN (Feb. 11, 2015) 
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2015/02/11/fisher-requests-supreme-court-
hear-case-against-ut-a-second-time.  Anti-affirmative action ballot initiatives 
could appear in several more states including Ohio, Missouri and Utah.  See 
John Lauerman & Janet Lorin, Affirmative Action Ruling Challenges Colleges 
Seeking Diversity, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-23/affirmative-action-ruling-
challenges-colleges-seeking-diversity.html. 
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not conclusively answered each other’s claims.  This article 
brings the various points and counterpoints under one 
framework of analysis.  Only by breaking down the traditional 
fault lines can steps forward be discussed. 
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